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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j)

(Supp.

1988)

provides

jurisdiction for an appeal from a civil judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Proceedings in the Court Below
The Crookstons commenced this action against Fire Insur-

ance and Rocky Mountain State Bank seeking damages.
thereafter

joined

third-party

Brewster, and Bert Berrett.

defendants

Jimmy

Fire Insurance
Jones,

Kyle

Brewster and Berrett in turn filed

claims against Syro Steel.
Fire Insurance later filed a separate subrogation action
in the Crookstons' name against Jones, Brewster, and Berrett in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. C-847061.

Upon motion by defendant Jones, the trial court consolidated

the separate action with the third-party complaints which Fire
Insurance had previously filed in the present action.
Ultimately Judge Frederick bifurcated the trials of the
Crookstons7 actions against Fire Insurance and the Bank (adjudicating liabilities for an insurance settlement) from Fire Insurance's subrogation action against Jones, Brewster, and Berrett
(adjudicating responsibility for the collapse of the Crookstons7
home).

Just before trial in the insurance action, the Crookstons

settled their claims against the Bank.

On the morning of trial,

the trial court dismissed Fire Insurance's cross-claims against the
Bank pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.
1

(R. 1541-42)

The trial of the Crookstons' claim against Fire Insurance
commenced on May 26, 1987 and ended on June 4, 1987.

At the

conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered its verdict against Fire
Insurance in the amount of $815,826.00 for compensatory damages and
$4,000,000.00 for exemplary damages.

Accordingly, the trial court

entered a judgment in the amount of $4,815,826,> 00 on June 11, 1987.
(R. 1543-45)

Based on the jury's findings, Judge Frederick ruled

that the Crookstons were entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
After a hearing, the trial court awarded attorney's fees and costs
and thereafter entered an additional judgment totaling $190,316.32.
(R. 2973)

Fire Insurance filed motions for a new trial, judgment

n.o.v., and remittitur which the trial court denied.

(R. 2959, 60)

Fire Insurance thereafter settled the subrogation claims
against

Berrett

Brewster.

and

Jones

and

took

default

judgment

against

The fourth party claims against Syro Steel were also

settled.
B.

Statement of Facts
This case involves the failure of Fire Insurance Ex-

change, a member of the Farmers Insurance Group, to timely and
properly adjust and settle a casualty loss to the Crookstons' home.
Through

a

series of misrepresentations

Insurance perpetrated

a

and

concealments, Fire

fraud on the Crookstons and on Rocky

Mountain State Bank ("the Bank"), holder of a first deed of trust
on the Crookstons' home and loss payee under the Fire Insurance
policy.

By means of a fraudulent and inadequate settlement with
2

the Bank, Fire Insurance obtained a release and satisfaction of the
Bank's claim on the policy.
ure.

The Bank then proceeded to foreclos-

As a result, the Crookstons lost their home and were forced

into bankruptcy.

The Crookstons filed suit against Fire Insurance,

resulting in a judgment, from which Fire Insurance now appeals.
Fire Insurance's statement of the facts quite naturally
recites the facts in a manner highly favorable to its position.
Respondents therefore provide a complete statement of the facts.1
1.

Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were married in 1973.

Mr.

Crookston continually worked two to three jobs and saved for many
years until 1978, when the Crookstons paid cash for a vacant lot in
Bountiful, Utah.

(R. 2000-1)

They continued to work and save

their money in anticipation of building their home on the unencumbered lot.
2.

In December 1980, the Crookstons obtained a con-

struction loan from the Bank in the amount of $60,000 and in the
early part of 1981, began construction.

(R. 2006) During the

course of construction, the Crookstons personally paid approximately $5,000 toward construction costs and paid the Bank $12,000 to
reduce

the

construction

loan.

(R. 2009; Ex's. 2, 5)

The

Crookstons also performed various services such as painting and
finish work in order to keep costs down.

x

(R. 2019-20, 2160)

On

For the Court's convenience, Appendix A attached hereto is a
descriptive outline of the witnesses and parties to show how they
interrelate to one another.
3

December 2, 1981, the roof of the Crookstons' home collapsed,
causing extensive damage.
3.

Kyle Brewster, the contractor who was building the

Crookstons' home, had approximately 40 years of contracting and
estimating experience. (R. 2150)

He testified that just prior to

the time of the collapse, the home was approximately two-thirds
completed and had the collapse not occurred, the home could have
been completed within budget during the next four to five weeks.
(R. 2159-60, 2181)

Besides the structure, scaffolding, other

equipment and unused building materials were also destroyed in the
collapse. (R. 2161-62, 2114)
4.

The Crookstons gave prompt notice to their insurer,

Fire Insurance, who assigned Denton Moser to investigate and adjust
the loss.

Other than taking pictures, Moser did very little to

determine the scope of the damage and evaluate the loss.
12)

(Ex. 11,

Fire Insurance did not contest coverage and admitted that the

cause of the collapse was irrelevant to the Crookstons' claim.
1889-90, 2236)

(R.

In mid-December, 1981, Fire Insurance retained Kent

Rich, an engineer, to determine the cause of the collapse for
purposes of protecting and enabling Fire Insurance to pursue a
subrogation claim.

Fire Insurance did not request Mr. Rich to

ascertain the scope of the damage or evaluate the loss for adjusting purposes.
5.

(R. 2655-57, 1926; Ex. 41, p. 3-4)
Within

a

few

weeks

after

the

collapse,

the

Crookstons retained attorney Ralph Klemm because they were con4

cerned that Fire Insurance was not doing anything to adjust the
loss.

In their first communication, Moser asked Klemm to assist

him in obtaining a bid to have the home repaired.

(R. 1686-87)

Mr. Klemm obtained an estimate from Rex Stallings, an experienced
contractor of 36 years. (R. 2097)
sought an estimate from Brewster.
6.
contractors:

The Crookstons and Moser also
(R. 2403-4)

By the end of March, 1982, Moser had the bids of two
(1) Brewster in the amount of $50,951, and

(2) Rex

Stallings in the amount of $49,600. (Ex. 38, p. 2; Ex. 40; R. 169394)

Based upon these bids, Moser submitted an internal request for

$50,000 settlement authority to the Pocatello regional office.
1977).

On

April

15, the

regional

office

extended

authority in the amount of $49,443.00. (Ex. 13, p.2)

(R.

settlement

In May, Moser

obtained a bid from Jimmy Jones, an architect, in the amount of
$74,000 (Ex. 11, p. 101), but ignored it without inquiry.

(Ex. 11,

p.101; R. 1992)
7.

Rather than offering anything to settle the claim,

Fire Insurance requested Rich, the engineer, to perform an analysis
of the observable structural damage.

(R. 2654-56, 2663)

On May

25, Rich prepared a report outlining some of the structural damage
that had to be addressed.

(Ex. 41, p.l)

Fire Insurance never

requested Mr. Rich to evaluate all of the damage, nor did it ever
inform

Rich

reconstruct

that his
the

house.

report would
(R. 2656)

be the basis
Rich

for

testified

a bid
that,

to

"The

approach that I took in making that investigation was not such that
5

my report could be used as a bid list for bidding the repair of or
of repairing the total structure." (Re 2654)

He then described how

the sheetrock covered most of the walls and there was no way to
determine the extent of the damages to the studs, joists, and the
plumbing, electrical and heating systems.
8.

(R. 2659, 2661-62)

During May, 1982, Fire Insurance replaced Moser with

a more experienced adjuster, Alan Clapperton.

Even though Clapper-

ton had no basis to doubt the validity of the prior three bids (R.
2242-43), he totally disregarded them without notice to or discussion with the Crookstons, their attorney, or the Bank.

(R. 1694,

1699, 2015-16)
9.

Knowing that Mr. Rich's report was limited in scope,

Clapperton took the report to Steven Phipps, a licensed contractor
of only three years.

(R. 2592)

Moser, the previous adjuster, had

contacted Phipps in February about possibly preparing a bid but did
not pursue it due to Phipps' lack of experience. (R. 1993, 2584)
When Clapperton contacted Phipps, Clapperton gave Phipps the Rich
report, represented that the report covered all of the damage, and
asked Phipps to prepare a bid based thereon.

(R. 2246)

Phipps

knew from prior experience that if he was required to rebuild the
Crookston home, he could submit supplemental bids and be paid for
additional work and materials not described in his original bid.
(R.

2610-11)

Phipps

then

prepared

a

bid

in

the

amount

$27,830.60 and delivered it to Clapperton on June 14, 1982.
11, pp. 109-115; R. 2247)

of
(Ex.

Knowing that his bid would not cover all
6

repairs, Phipps expressly qualified his bid, stating "This bid is
to do only the items listed here and outlined by the engineer Kent
Rich." (Ex. 11, p. 114)

Phipps did not believe he would be asked

to actually rebuild the home but nonetheless qualified his bid to
ensure that if he were ever requested to rebuild he could supplement his bid for additional items. (R. 2605, 2621)
10.

Mr. Phipps is the son-in-law of a Farmers Insurance

agent and was doing a substantial amount of insurance repair work
for Fire Insurance through his father-in-law's referrals. (R. 261819, 2593-94)

Phipps7 credibility was seriously questioned, not

only because of his bias, but because his bid was wholly
quate and disproportionate to the other bids.

inade-

Phipps admitted at

trial that his bid omitted numerous items that should have been
included, such as the broken cement driveway

(R. 2114, 2632-33),

the cost of engineer services (R. 2626) ; numerous building supplies
and material that were destroyed
foundation

wall

(Ex.

42, pp.

(R. 2634); a large crack in a

26-29,

R.

2633);

the

damage

to

electrical, plumbing and heating systems (R. 2634-42); sandblasting
the interior wall
thereto

(R. 2634-36); paint, stain and labor relating

(R. 2637); waterproofing

the outer shell

(R. 2638-40);

additional interest on the construction loan during the rebuilding
phase

(R. 2644); and numerous other items

(R. 2642-43).

Phipps

admitted on cross-examination that his bid was incomplete and that
any representation that his bid would be sufficient to rebuild the
home would be untrue.

(R. 2646-48, 2651-53)
7

11.

The Phipps bid was based upon salvaging and reusing

most of the interior walls and floors, even though he did not know
whether they could be salvaged. (R. 2627-29)
evidence

that

such

salvage

was

It was clear from the

impossible.

A

disinterested

witness, Argen Jager, a contractor of 50 years experience who
bought the collapsed house from the Bank (R. 2665-66), testified
that when he rebuilt the house, he had to completely tear out the
interior due to the extensive damage and was able to salvage very
little of the original building materials. (R. 2666-67)
12.
14, 1982.

Clapperton received the qualified Phipps bid on June

(R. 2247)

Knowing that the bid was inadequate and did

not include all of the amounts owing under the policy (R. 2248-52,
2320-21; Ex. 11, p. 114), he immediately called the Bank to arrange
a settlement meeting on June 16.
13.
telephoned

Since March,

Fire

settlement.

Insurance

(R. 2253-54, 2035)

1982, Mr. Klemm
on

and

a regular basis

the Bank had

inquiring

about

Fire Insurance continually told them that the adjust-

ers were working on a settlement, and that they would shortly get
back to them with an offer. (R. 1697-1700, 2033-34)

The Bank had

even tried to find a contractor to bid the repairs, but was
unsuccessful.

(R. 2035)

demand for $50,000.

As early as April, Mr. Klemm had made a

(R. 1695-96)

Clapperton therefore knew that

Mr. Klemm would resist any settlement based upon the Phipps bid.
14.

On June 16, 1982, Mr. Klemm contacted Clapperton,

expressing concern over the delay and again requesting the status
8
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(R. 2037)

Mr, Murdock, the Bank officer, had had only one or two

experiences

involving

concerned, he

loss payee coverage.

telephoned

the

Bank's attorney

(R. 2032)

Being

Brent Ward, who

advised that he could proceed with the settlement.

(R. 2037-38)

Clapperton then insisted that the Bank execute a proof of loss form
which

contained

the

following

language, "The said

company

in

consideration of such payment to or for the named insured is hereby
discharged forever from all further claims by reason of said loss
or damage."

(Ex. 11, p. 117; R. 2040)

The reverse side of the

settlement check given to the Bank also contained a total release
of the Bank's claims for insurance.
17.

(Ex. 16)

Mr. Murdock testified on behalf of the Bank that had

he known about the other bids, he would not have settled for the
$27,830.60, plus interest, because the large discrepancy between
the bids would have called into question the validity of the Phipps
bid. (R. 2039-40)
the Bank, he knew:

Clapperton admitted that at the time he met with
(1) the Bank was relying upon the Phipps bid

when it agreed to settle; (2) that the outstanding balance on the
loan was close to $60,000.00; (3) that the settlement amount was
insufficient to prevent the Bank from foreclosing; (4) that the
Bank would seek any deficiency from the Crookstons and foreclose on
the Crookstons' property; and

(5) that experiencing foreclosure

would be very traumatic to the Crookstons.
2261, 2265; Ex. 11, pp. 84, 86)
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opposed to bankruptcy (R. 1816-17, 2412, 2119), but felt they had
no choice and filed under Chapter 7 on July ll? 1982.

(Ex. 6) The

bankruptcy case is still open pending the outcome of this case.
(R. 1864)

To avoid additional interest, attorney's fees and costs,

the Crookstons consented to a deed of their property to the Bank in
lieu of the threatened foreclosure. (R. 1713-14; Ex. 30, p.222)
20.

There was overwhelming evidence that Clapperton was

dishonest, not only in his actions at the time of his fraudulent
scheme with the Bank, but also in his testimony at trial.

His

testimony was inconsistent with most other witnesses and documents.
For example, at trial, he denied that his meeting with the Bank was
for the purpose of settlement and claimed that the Bank forced him
into settling.

(R. 2255-56)

Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's super-

visor, testified, however, that Clapperton told him that he was
leaving the office to settle with the Bank. (R. 1932-33)

Clapper-

ton represented the Phipps bid ($27,830.60) as legitimate and the
only

amount owing under the policy

Insurance's

reserve

(estimate of

purposes) was set at $60,000.
Clapperton's

trial

testimony

even though he knew Fire

loss

internal

accounting

(R. 1912, 1914, 2269-70; Ex. 14)
even differed

deposition testimony on material issues.
When his

for

radically

from his

(R« 2269-76, 2280-85)

inconsistent testimony was pointed

out to the jury,

Clapperton became extremely nervous and clearly appeared as if he
were lying, so much so that his attorney in closing statements
tried to explain away his nervousness.
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i.
Using the C r o o k s t o n s ' failure to sign
a proof of loss form as grounds for denying
their cJ vr3 r pari- i cu'l ar"l v where t h e Crookstons

and
. wing

were not provided with such a form, and
adequate evidence of the loss had been provided
to Fire Insurance. (R. 2325)
j.
Rejecting the bids of Brewster,
Stallings and Jones because of insufficient
detail, without requesting the additional
information and detail, (R. 2326-27)
k.
Failing to disclose to the Crookstons
that Fire Insurance was rejecting the other
bids and the reasons therefor. (R. 2327-29)
1.
Not communicating with the Crookstons
during the entire adjusting process. (R. 2329)
m.
Refusing to consider
additional
claims of the Crookstons after settling with
the Bank, denying responsibility to the
insurance commissioner when a complaint was
filed by the Crookstons, and forcing the
Crookstons to bring legal action. (R. 2330-31)
n.
Refusing to clean up after the
collapse even after the city had given notice
and threatened to condemn the property due to
the hazardous situation. (R. 2332)
o.
Delaying over six months while the
Crookston home was unfit for occupation, before
making any attempts to settle. (R. 23 33)
p.
Maintaining a company policy that the
only duty of an adjuster is to protect the
financial interest of the insurance company and
not the insured. (R. 1894-95, 2333)
22.

In an attempt to seek redress without filing a legal

action, the Crookstons complained to the Utah Insurance Department
shortly before October 18, 1982.

(R. 2226; Ex. 9, pp. 24-27)

Fire

Insurance responded on November 2, 1982, and denied that any amount
was owing to the Crookstons.

(Ex. 9, pp. 28-31)

The insurance

department finally responded on January 10, 1983, stating that it
did not have the resources to resolve this dispute and suggested
14
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury found Fire Insurance Exchange liable to the
Crookstons for breach of contract, breach of its implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

On appeal, Fire Insurance claims (1) that the

trial court erred with respect to jury instructions on comparative
bad faith and fraud, (2) that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to establish the elements of fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (3) that the compensatory and
punitive damage awards were excessive, (4) that punitive damages
are unconstitutional, (5) that the Crookstons claims are barred by
a contractual time limitation, (6) that the trial court abused its
discretion

in awarding

attorneys

fees to the Crookstons, and

(7) that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
continue the trial and by dismissing Rocky Mountain State Bank,

In

response, Crookstons argue as follows.
The

trial

court's

refusal

to

instruct

the

jury

on

comparative bad faith was proper, because comparative bad faith is
a tort concept not applicable to contract actions. The trial court
did, however, properly instruct the jury that either party can
breach the contract and that it could not award contract damages
for injuries not caused by Fire Insurance's breach.
Fire Insurance has waived its right to contest the fraud
instructions because it failed to object to the instructions at
trial.

Notwithstanding

this

waiver,
16
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t e

Fire Insurance acted in bad faith.

Additionally, there are two

Utah statutes which tolled the running of the limitation.

At the

very most, the limitation can only act to bar the Crookstons7
contract action.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect
to the award of attorney's fees, which are awardable for fraud and
bad faith.

The trial court determined the amount of the award

after considering specific and extensive evidence relevant to the
guidelines previously set by this Court.

Fire Insurance has either

waived or not been prejudiced by other claimed defects in the fee
award.
The trial court did not err in refusing to continue the
trial date while Fire Insurance sought alternative grounds for a
contribution claim against Rocky Mountain State Bank.
completed

After having

four years of discovery, Fire Insurance presented at

trial all of its evidence against the Bank and argued that the Bank
caused the Crookstons' injuries.

In any event, Fire Insurance had

no vested right to have its contribution claims adjudicated in the
Crookstons action against Fire Insurance and nothing prohibits it
now from pursuing any such claim.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
At trial, plaintiffs asserted

four causes of action:

(1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith
18
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breach is the basis for an action in
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mtra, t,

Accordingly

.e

the California

courts may accept the notion of comparing the

insurer's and the insured's tortious conduct, such comparative
principles do not apply in a contract action.

Were this Court to

accept Fire Insurance's invitation to engraft a tort concept in a
contract action, it would clearly be a step backward from Beck.
Furthermore, Fire Insurance's position is contrary to its vigorous
argument to the trial court that this case can only give rise to a
cause of action in contract, not one in tort.

(See Fire Insur-

ance's Trial Memorandum, R. 1436)
Fire Insurance attempts to rationalize the blending of
tort and contract by reference to the Utah Liability Reform Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 through 43 (1987) in which "fault" is
defined as the breach of any Legal duty.

This Court has speci-

fically held that the Liability Reform Act does not apply to
conduct occurring prior to 1986.
952

(Utah 1987).

Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P. 2d

The conduct here occurred during 1982, well

before passage of the act.
Since the proposed instruction was erroneous as a matter
of law, it obviously follows that the failure to give the instruction was not prejudicial error.

Snvderville Transportation Co.

Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980),,
In any event, the issue of whether plaintiffs' conduct
caused any of the alleged damages was presented and extensively
argued to the jury in the context of a contract action.

From its

opening statement, Fire Insurance criticized the plaintiffs and
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•- ..entud and

3.
Did the plaintiffs breach the contract of
insurance with defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange? Answer: NO.
4.
If you answered question No. 3 "yes," was
such breach a proximate cause of the damages
alleged by plaintiffs? Answer: N/A (R. 1534)
The trial court did not deny or restrict Fire Insurance's right to
present evidence or argue that plaintiffs' actions and omissions
caused their damages.

On the contrary, such position was a major

part of appellant's case.

With good reason, however, the jury did

not find appellant's position persuasive*
C.
There Is Ample Evidence To Support A Finding That Fire Insurance Defrauded and Intentionally Inflicted Emotional Distress On
The Crookstons.
1.

Fire Insurance Bears the Burden of Demonstrating that the Crookstons' Evidence Was
Insufficient to Support the Jury's Verdict.

The standard for reviewing a trial court's refusal to
grant a motion for a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., or new
trial was stated in McCloud v. Baum, 569 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977) as
follows:
In reviewing denial of motions for a directed
verdict, judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative
for a new trial, this court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the motion was made.
In reviewing a trial court's exercise of
discretion upon a motion for a new trial, this
court examines the record to determine whether
the evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust.
If there be an
evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, then
the denial of the new trial must be affirmed.
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on t h e issue in controversy, a jury question
exists and the motion should be denied.
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The instant case is a hybrid of the first and third-party
situations.

The Crookstons were subject to third-party claims of

the Bank under the terms of the construction

loan agreement.

Because the Bank was a loss payee, Fire Insurance Exchange, in
essence, was in the position of protecting the named insureds, the
Crookstons, from claims of the Bank.
Crookstons admit that Fire Insurance had no contractual
fiduciary duties to the Crookstons, but equity certainly implied
such duties in the circumstances of this case.

In discussing the

basis for fiduciary relationships in Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica. Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the Court stated:
A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be
created by contract or by circumstances where
equity will imply a higher duty in a relationship because the trusting party has been
induced to relax the care and vigilance he
would ordinarily exercise. [Emphasis added.]
657 P. 2d at 749.

Fire Insurance cannot have it both ways.

Either

it had fiduciary duties to protect the Crookstons' interests during
the negotiations with the Bank or it had a duty not to interfere
with the Crookstons7 ability to represent their own interests in
the negotiations.
Fraud has many guises as was recognized by the Court in
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978):
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise and are resorted to in order to gain an
advantage over another.
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induced the other party not to investigate.

Adamson v. Brockbank,

112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
c.

There is ample evidence
elements of fraud.

to

establish

all

Clapperton was in possession of three bids in excess of
$49,000 and had authority to settle for $49,443.

Nonetheless, he

sought and obtained a fictitious bid which was just a little more
than one-half

of the other bids received.

The evidence was

undisputed that the bid did not account for many items and was
based on an engineering report which was not intended to be the
basis for a bid.

Clapperton knew the bid was insufficient, that

the Crookstons would object to the bid, and that the Bank would not
settle for such an amount if the other bids were disclosed. Hence,
in order to accomplish his scheme, Clapperton simply told Mr. Klemm
that he had no authority to settle, concealed the existence of the
Phipps bid, and surreptitiously conducted his negotiations with the
Bank.

The fraud was complete when he refused to deal further with

the Crookstons and the Crookstons could do nothing to prevent the
Bank from taking their property.
All elements of fraud were satisfied.

First, Clapperton

made representations and concealed material facts—the amount of
money necessary to restore the home; the amount owing under the
policy; his lack of readiness to settle; his inclusion of the
Crookstons in settlement negotiations with the Bank; concealment of
the Phipps bid and settlement meeting with the Bank; and concealment of the other three bids from the Bank.
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Second, the represen-

tations concerned presently existing facts—the amount required to
complete the home; Clapperton's authority to settle; Clapperton's
state of mind and intention; the existence of the bids and settlement meetings.

Third, the representations were false—the Phipps

bid was incomplete and not representative of the true amount to
complete the structure; other amounts were owing under the policy;
Clapperton had authority to settle with the Bank; Clapperton had no
intention of including the Crookstons in the negotiations. Fourth,
Clapperton clearly knew the representations were false or at the
very least made them in reckless disregard.

Fifth, the representa-

tions were intended to induce action on the part of the Bank and
inaction on the part of the Crookstons—Clapperton induced the Bank
to

settle

for

an

inadequate

amount;

Clapperton

lulled

the

Crookstons into not acting to protect their interests until the
settlement with the Bank was complete.

Sixth, the Bank and the

Crookstons acted in ignorance of the truth—the Bank was not aware
of the other bids which Clapperton had obtained; the Crookstons
were not aware of the Phipps bid and did not intervene because
Clapperton did not inform them of the negotiations.
Bank

relied

on the

Phipps bid

and

the

Seventh, the

Crookstons

relied on

Clapperton7s representation that they would be included in negotiations.

Eighth, the Bank was induced to act and the Crookstons were

lulled into inaction.

Ninth, the Crookstons were injured when the

Bank took their property and forced them into bankruptcy.
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The

evidence is clear and convincing that Clapperton practiced a fraud
on the Crookstons.
d.

There is no justification for this court's
review of jury instruction nos. 28 and 29.
(1) Fire Insurance was waived
review.

its right of

Fire Insurance properly notes that it failed to except to
Instructions Nos. 28 and 29.

Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

dure expressly provides that, "No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto."

Fire Insurance seeks haven in the rare exception to the

rule.
This Court has discussed the exception to Rule 51 on
numerous occasions.

See, for example, E.A. Strout Western Realty

Agency Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d

1320

(Utah 1983),

Wagner v. Olsen. 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971), and McCall
v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954).

In each of these

instances, the Court required the party seeking review of the
instruction to present a persuasive reason or special circumstance
which would warrant the invocation of the exception.

The factors

which the Court considers in granting an exception were stated in
Holton v. Holton. 121 Utah 451, 243 P.2d 438, 439 (1952):
Although the New Rules of Civil Procedure were
intended to provide liberality in procedure, it
is nevertheless expected that they will be
followed, and unless reasons satisfactory to
the court are advanced as a basis for relief
from complying with them, parties will not be
excused from so doing.
It is only when a
showing is made that some inadvertence,
28

surprise, excusable neglect or mistake has
occurred and that substantial injustice will be
done, that a party will be relieved from
failure to comply with the rules. [Citations
omitted.]
Fire Insurance claims that there will be an injustice
done

if the Court

instructions.

does not

consider the allegedly

erroneous

However, it is clear that the requirement is two-

fold—the proponent must demonstrate not only an injustice but also
some extenuating circumstance which warrants departure from the
rule.

Fire Insurance has not even attempted to state a reason for

its failure to except to the jury instructions.

Thus, it has not

justified its call upon the discretion of +"*-»s Court to review the
instructions.
(2) The claimed error in the fraud instruction
was not prejudicial.
Not all error constitutes grounds for reversal.

The

error must be "substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there
is

a

reasonable

resulted."

likelihood

that

unfairness

or

injustice

has

Ewell and Son. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 27 Utah 2d

188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1972).

The claimed error in Instruction

28 (fraud) has not resulted in any unfairness or injustice to Fire
Insurance.
Instruction 28 was an adaptation of a model instruction
used in the federal courts.

Devitt, Blackmar and Wolff, Federal

Jury Practice and Instructions, 4th Ed. § 83.02

(1987).

Fire

Insurance claims this instruction is erroneous in that it failed to
include certain elements including (lj the misrepresentation must
29

concern a presently existing fact, (2) the misrepresentation must
have been made for the purpose of inducing the Crookstons or the
Bank in behalf of Crookstons to act upon it, and (3) the reliance
was made in ignorance of the misrepresentation's falsity.

However,

the record is clear that substantial or admitted evidence of each
of these elements was presented to the jury.
It is unrefuted (1) that Clapperton did not disclose to
the Bank the three other bids (R. 2039), and (2) that he represented to the Bank that the Phipps bid would fully repair the home and
the amount of the Phipps bid was all that was owing under the
policy.

(R. 2038)

Mr. Murdock testified that he would not have

settled based upon the Phipps bid had he known about the other
bids.

(R. 2040, 2317-18)

Clapperton further admitted that he knew

the Bank was relying on the Phipps bid.

(R. 2261)

Clapperton further represented to Klemm on June 16 that
Fire Insurance was not yet ready to settle but would shortly get
back to Klemm.
1700-1)

There was no disclosure of the Phipps bid.

At this time Clapperton had already received the Phipps

bid and had set up the settlement meeting with the Bank.
37)

(R.

(R. 2035-

Klemm described how he was trusting the adjusters to deal in

good faith and felt betrayed after he learned of the settlement.
(R. 1677-78, 1704)

Without the opportunity to be involved in the

settlement, Klemm could not disclose the other bids and point out
why the Bank should not settle for such a small amount.
35, 2313-14, 2506)

(R. 1733-

Once the Bank had settled and released its
30

claim for insurance, it had no alternative but to collect the
balance from the Crookstons.

Since the Crookstons had no money,

this directly resulted in their bankruptcy and loss of their home.
(R. 1851, 1882-83, 2480-1, 2505-6)
All of the above misrepresentations and concealments concerned presently existing facts and were made for the purpose of
inducing Crookstons (through their attorney) and the Bank to act or
refrain from acting to their detriment.

Though Clapperton denies

making some of the above misrepresentations to Klemm, there is no
evidence that prior to the settlement Klemm or the Bank knew the
falsity of said misrepresentations.
that to

find

fraud, the

Further, Instruction 28 stated

Crookstons

and

their

agent must be

"deceived" by the representations, which is equivalent to the third
missing element at issue.

Therefore, each of the omitted elements

asserted by appellant were supported by admitted, uncontested or
clear and convincing evidence, resulting in no unfairness, injustice, or prejudice to Fire Insurance.
(3) Instruction No. 29 states the appropriate
law.
Fire Insurance maintains that since the Crookstons and
Fire

Insurance

were

in a first-party

contract

situation, the

parties were practically adversaries and therefore "the Crookstons
were not entitled to 'heedlessly accept as true' whatever Fire
Insurance told them."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 58)

Fire Insurance

misperceives what this Court said

in Beck v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

Beqk distinguished the third-
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party insurance situation from the first-party insurance situation,
i.e. fiduciary vs. non-fiduciary duties.

Beck does not stand for

the proposition that an insurer in a first-party insurance contract
may totally disregard the interests of the insured in the exercise
of its own rights.
Although the insurer in a first-party contract situation
may not necessarily be a fiduciary, the insurer is not held to a
lower

standard

than

other businesses

in the community.

The

argument that Fire Insurance makes here is similar to the argument
made

in Berkeley

Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P. 2d 798

(Utah 1980) wherein a bank which had fraudulently

induced the

defendants to sign promissory notes argued that the defendants had
no right to rely on the Bank's representations.

In addressing this

issue, the Court forcefully rejected such a contention:
It can hardly be maintained that the general
moral level of business and other financial
relationships would be enhanced by a rule of
law which would allow a person to defend
against a willful, deliberate fraud by stating,
"You should not have trusted or believed me" or
"Had you not been so gullible you would not
have been [so] deceived." The rules governing
fraud should foster intercourse based on trust,
forthrightness, and honesty.
[Citations
omitted.]
607 P. 2d at 805.

Although the Crookstons and Fire Insurance

Exchange had competing interests in the adjustment of the loss,
this so called adversarial posture did not place the Crookstons in
a position where they had no right to place trust in what Fire

32

Insurance was saying or excuse Fire Insurance from being forthright
and honest.
Insurance companies have steadfastly maintained the right
to rely on representations of insureds.

In fact, insurers may seek

rescission or deny coverage based upon an insured's material misrepresentation,

omission

or

concealment^.

Mutual Life Ins. Co. of St. Paul, Minnesota,

Beraer v. Minnesota
723

P.2d

1988); see also, Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1) (1974).2

388

(Utah

There is no

justification for a double standard, particularly at the expense of
an insured.
The jury was instructed (No. 20) that the policy did not
"create a relationship of trust and reliance," between the parties
(R. 1500)

This instruction was sufficient to meet appellant's

concern and when Instructions 20 and 29 are read together, there is
no prejudice in any event.
3.

Fire Insurance Intentionally Inflicted
Emotional Distress on the Crookstons.
a.

The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and
outrageous.

Fire Insurance cites Saltou v. Dependable Insurance Co.,
394 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) for the erroneous proposition
that any act connected with a contract cannot constitute a tort.
This certainly is not the case in Utah where this Court has stated,
" . . . acts constituting a breach of contract may also result in

2

This section has now been replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 31A21-105(2) (as amended) effective July 1, 1986.
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breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and may give
rise to causes of action in tort."

Beck, 701 P.2d at 800 n. 3.

See also DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983).

The

fact that a contractual relationship exists between two parties
does not immunize one party from liability in tort to the other.
Indeed, the contract may place a party in the very position which
enables the tort to arise.
Restatement

(Second)

of

Torts

§ 46

comment

e

(1965)

explicitly notes that abuse of the power to affect a party can be
the basis upon which extreme and outrageous behavior may be found:
The extreme and outrageous character of the
conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of
a position, or a relation with the other, which
gives him actual or apparent authority over the
other, or power to affect his interests.
As noted above, when the Crookstons7 house collapsed, Fire Insurance had contractual duties to both the Crookstons and the Bank.
The

relationship

between

the

Crookstons and

Fire Insurance was

closely akin to a third party liability situation where failure to
properly resolve the third party claim would result in personal
exposure to the insured.
Bank

(loss

payee)

had

Here, Fire Insurance's payment to the
a

direct

and

immediate

impact

on

the

Crookstons.
Fire

Insurance

has

cited

cases

wherein

infliction of emotional distress was not found,,

intentional

In each of these

cases the alleged wrongful conduct was only the insurer's failure
to investigate or to bargain w|th the claimants.
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Courts, however,

have found intentional infliction of emotional distress in circumstances where the insurer has abused its position by overt acts
which have gone beyond protecting the insurer's legitimate interests.

The distinction is overt action as opposed to inaction.

See, for example, National Security Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen,
447 So.2d 133 (Ala. 1983) (investigators misrepresented themselves
as policemen, threatened

insured, attempted to bribe witness);

Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 10
Cal. App. 3d 376 (1970) (adjuster terminated disability payments on
false allegation of pre-existing condition); Dominauez v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society. 438 So.2d 58 (Fla, Ct. App. 1983) aff'd 467
So.2d 281 (Fla. 1985) (adjuster lied about doctor's report, misrepresented policy coverage and attempted to obtain release from
policyholder

under

duress) ;

Casualty Co. . 667 F.2d
statement

and

22

and

Green v. State Farm Fire and

(9th Cir. 1982)

gave to police

(insurer took sworn

for arson prosecution, adjuster

threatened prosecution even when he knew there was insufficient
evidence

for

such

prosecution,

and

adjuster

policeman informed neighbors of suspected arson).

masquerading

as

In each of the

foregoing cases, the insurer stepped beyond the bounds of civilized
conduct while adjusting claims. Such is the case here.
A bank will always seek collection of the balance owing
on a loan and pursue foreclosure when immediate collection appears
unlikely.

When a significant loss has occurred and an insurer

improperly settles with a mortgagee bank, the insured is parti35

cularly

vulnerable

because

such

a loss usually

causes severe

financial hardship.
Clapperton admittedly knew that the Bank would look to
the Crookstons for any monies not paid by the insurance, yet he
purposely sought an incomplete and unrealistic bid from an insider,
concealed the bid from the Crookstons and deliberately kept the
Crookstons

from

being

represented

in the negotiations.

Fire

Insurance left the Crookstons fully vulnerable', to foreclosure and
bankruptcy with all its emotional consequences.
1882-83)
position

(R. 1839, 1851,

Such overt conduct was an abuse of Fire Insurance's
and

constituted

extreme and outrageous

conduct which

should not be tolerated in civilized society.
b.

The Crookstons suffered severe emotional distress.

This Court has yet to define what constitutes severe
emotional

distress.

However,

the

California

Appellate

Court

addressed the issue in Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co.,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 10 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1970):
The term "severe emotional distress" is
discussed in comment j to section 4 6 of the
Restatement of Torts, Second • . . . "Complete
emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in
this world, and some degree of transient and
trivial emotional distress is a part of the
price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so
severe that no reasonable man could be expected
to endure it. The intensity and duration of
the distress are factors to be considered in
determining its severity."
It appears,
therefore, that in this context, "severe" means
substantial or enduring as distinguished from
trivial or transitory. Severe emotional dis36

tress means, then, emotional distress of such
substantial quantity or enduring quality that
no reasonable man in a civilized society should
be expected to endure it, [Citations omitted.]
89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.

The distress suffered here did not result

from frustration inherent in the normal adjusting process.

Rather,

the evidence showed that the Crookstons severely suffered from a
financial collapse which forced them into bankruptcy with all its
attendant embarrassment and humiliation.
Mr. Crookston, faced with the dramatic reversal in his
finances and with the loss of his home, was unable to continue his
work, school, and life in general.

He described his condition

after the settlement:
I was numb. I stopped feeling . . . whenever
I'd think about it, first it was pain and then
it went to rage, disgust, bitterness, hatred,
revenge, and those thoughts consumed my mind .
basically, I stopped being rational, I
guess. I broke down. I couldn't do the things
that I did before.
I found them — my selfesteem was gone.
I felt that I had lost the
respect of everyone that knew m^. I felt that
I was a failure and became paranoid and afraid
of what everybody thought of me. It appeared
that my wife at the time had lost confidence in
me to support her and to provide for my family.
These are things that I was always proud of. I
always worked very hard . . . .
for all the
work I'd ever done since before I was in high
school up until that time, I had worked very
hard and I was proud of what I did. I always
did a good job and what was it for?
What?
What was the end result?
I had lost everything. I was bankrupt, and I lost motivation.
I lost self-confidence. I lost the ability to
think properly, to make proper judgments, to
even think about what I was doing.
(R. 212124)
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He admitted

having a nervous breakdown.

described him as a "basket case."

(R. 1711)

(R. 2197)

Mr. Klemm

At trial nearly four

years after the settlement, Mr. Crookston testified that he was
still unable to be fully functional due to the suffering from this
traumatic incident.

(R. 2125-28)

Mrs. Crookston described her emotional suffering:
...
It was a devastation to me. I felt like
I was trying to pick myself up, and that upon
hearing that it was over with between the
insurance company and the bank, that somebody
was trying to pound me into the ground, that I
was the nail, and they were hitting me on the
head, and that the settlement started this nail
going into the ground, and then with t h e —
with this person suing me, that was just
another hit on the head driving me into the
ground a little further, and then having to go
through the bankruptcy and the humiliation of
taking out the bankruptcy, that the nail was
being pounded further and further into the
ground.
Then there was an article in the newspaper
about us losing our house, and it was just
another blow on the head.
Then to have my
father co-sign for a loan, I mean, I felt like
that nail was practically driven into the
ground, and that I have been trying to pull
that nail out of the ground all these years.
(R. 2415)
She then described how she felt useless, that life was not worth
living, and the only thing that kept her going was her two children.

(R. 2416-17)

Far

from being transitory

or trivial

the

Crookstons emotional stress was enduring, substantial, and therefore compensable under the terms of Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 46 (1965).
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c.

The emotional distress was proximately caused
by Fire Insurance/s conduct.

The collapse of the house certainly had an impact on the
Crookstons.

However, the Crookstons considered it a temporary set-

back since the insurance policy was there to provide a new start.
(R. 2017) After the collapse, the Crookstons continued to work and
meet their financial responsibilities.

(R. 1839, 1851, 2017-18)

Mr. Crookston returned to school to complete his education.
2225)

(R.

It was only after the settlement with the Bank, the loss of

the Crookston^' property and the bankruptcy that Mr. Crookston was
unable to continue working and to pursue his degree at the university.
The trial judge instructed the jury in at least two
different instructions (Instruction Nos. 25 and 37, R. 1506, 1520)
that it could award damages only for injuries proximately caused by
Fire

Insurance's

wrongful

conduct.

Furthermore,

Crookstons'

counsel in closing argument reaffirmed th&t the Crookstons were not
seeking

compensation

for

emotional

distress

caused

factors:

Nowr building

a home [is

a]

very

stressful

situation for anyone. No one is going to deny
that. They suffered a great deal of stress as
they went through the struggles and the
problems of building a home.
They are not
seeding compensation for that, obviously not,
but a collapse occurred, a loss that was
insured.
That was also very emotionally
traumatic. They are not seeking compensation
for that. (R. 2680)
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by

other

There is nothing in the record which would support a contention
that the jury awarded any damages for emotional distress that Fire
Insurance did not proximately cause.
II.
A.

THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGE AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE.

The Evidence Of Specific Economic Loss Is Uncontested.
The jury awarded the Crookstons $815,826.00 in compen-

satory damages.

After calculating the Crookstons' losses, includ-

ing Mr. Crookston's past income and the future income he would
continue to lose during the three year period after trial while Mr.
Crookston completed his degree, economist Paul Randle testified
that the Crookstons' special damages were $323,399.00.

Fire Insur-

ance has not contested the economic losses on appeal but claims
that the remainder of the compensatory award was excessive.
It is important to note that Dr. Randle's computations
were based upon the assumption that Mr. Crookston would receive
monetary recovery at the time of trial, thus allowing him the means
to emotionally and financially recover, and by 1990, he would be
able to complete his education and be gainfully employed.
2465)
this

(R.

Obviously, Mr. Crookston has received no recovery due to
appeal, which means

his

economic

damages would

be even

greater.
B.

The General Damages Awarded Were Appropriate.
Larry and Randi Crookston each suffered as the result of

Fire Insurance's wrongful and egregious acts cind each should be
compensated

for

his

and

her

individual
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emotional

and

mental

distress.

Furthermore, as was noted at trial, Larry and Randi

Crookston are no longer married.

Accordingly, the $246,213.50

awarded to each plaintiff for general damages will not be used to
maintain a single household.
Fire Insurance incorrectly asserts that the $246,213.50
awarded to each of the Crookstons compensated them only for their
emotional distress, anxiety, loss of joy of life, and motivation.
Although these losses were substantial the general damages also
included an award for the loss of credit or financial reputation.
The Court specifically has noted that such an award is appropriate
as a foreseeable consequence for bad faith conduct.

Beck, 701 P.2d

at 802.
Mr. Crookston testified that after the bankruptcy, he
reaffirmed the debt on his credit card in an attempt to preserve
his standing with his bank.

Notwithstanding the payment of the

debt, the bank cancelled his credit card.

(R. 2119-20)

Mr.

Crookston further testified that after being solicited by a finance
company to borrow money, he was unable to obtain a loan when the
lender found that the Crookstons had once declared bankruptcy.
2120-21)

Mrs. Crookston had a similar experience.

that she applied

(R.

She testified

for a loan to finance a musical instrument,

allowing the instrument to be used as security.

The Bank refused

to extend credit to her unless her father agreed to co-sign the
note.

(R. 2413-14)
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Although Dr. Randle was unable to quantify the exact
amount of the loss caused by the bankruptcy, he testified that the
inability to obtain credit is a real and significant loss, especially in today's society where very few people have the resources
to pay cash for items such as automobiles and homes.

(R. 2476-77)

Even though the jury did not specify the amount awarded for the
loss of financial reputation, the law permitted such an award to
each plaintiff.
Fire Insurance cites the Court's reduction of damages for
mental distress in First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards,
653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) to bolster its contention that the damages
awarded here were excessive.
cantly dissimilar.

The factual situations are signifi-

In J.B.J. Feedvards, a bank had wrongfully

obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment on some of the intervening plaintiffs' business assets—266 head of cattle.

The interven-

ing plaintiffs were unable to sell the cattle and use the proceeds
until the attachment was lifted and an appeal completed.

As a

result, the intervening plaintiffs claimed dctmages for anxiety,
frustration

and

embarrassment

among

other claims

for damages.

There is no indication that the intervenors' lives were affected
outside the business context in which the wrongful act occurred or
that the intervenors were forced into bankruptcy.
By contrast, the circumstances here are far more compelling.

The Crookstons had been planning and saving for many years

to attain their dream of owning a home.
42

Mr. Crookston had been

working two jobs and attending school to upgrade his employment.
After the collapse, the
salvage the dream.

insurance policy provided the means to

As recognized in Beck, 701 P.2d at 802, an

insurance policy is specifically designed and marketed as a means
to

preserve

misfortune.

the

policyholder's

emotional

security

in

times

of

In this case, however, the insurer's wrongful acts not

only robbed the Crookstons of their dream but turned the dream into
a nightmare wherein they lost their property, savings, financial
reputation, emotional well-being and mental health.
temporary business
case.

reversal as occurred

This was no

in the J.B.J. Feedvards

Fire Insurance destroyed the very foundation of the family's

security.
This Court has recognized that mental suffering
less real

because it is unaccompanied

Prince v. Peterson,

538

P.2d

1325, 1329

by physical
(Utah

is no

injury.

In

1975), the Court

considered the award of damages for slander stating:
It is of course to be appreciated that there
are difficulties involved in placing an exact
dollar-and-cents valuation on damages caused by
an injury of this character.
However, when
physical injury is involved, courts have no
hesitancy in allowing and approving substantial
awards as general damages which include pain
and suffering. The pain and suffering inflicted on the mind and the emotions by such
wrongful act of another is no less real; and
should be no less entitled to be compensated
for. [Emphasis added.]
The Court did express concern in J.B.J. Feedyards that
emotional distress damages should be awarded with caution.
P.2d at 598.

653

This concern is shared by other courts and commen43

tatorsc

However, such concern is assuaged in two circumstances—

first, where the nature of the conduct is so egregious that
emotional distress naturally flows therefrom, and second, where the
trial judge has specifically reviewed the propriety of the award.
Both circumstances are present here.
Professor Prosser in discussing the rationale supporting
the

cause

of

action

for

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress commented upon the relationship between the conduct and
the need for physical harm in emotional distress cases as follows:
The change in the Restatement in 1948 rejected
any absolute necessity for physiccil results.
Probably the conclusion to be reached is that
where physical harm is lacking the courts will
properly tend to look for more in the way of
extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental
disturbance claimed is not fictitious; but that
if the enormity of the outrage itself carries
conviction that there has in fact been severe
and serious emotional distress, which is
neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not
required.
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40, 53 (1956).

As

detailed elsewhere, the actions of Fire Insuramce were extreme and
outrageous.

There is nothing fictitious or trivial about the

Crookstons' bankruptcy and loss of their property.

Given the

egregious conduct and succeeding events, there is no doubt that the
Crookstons claims for mental and emotional distress are real,
unfeigned and far from trivial.
The Court has previously observed that, " . . . when the
determination of the jury has been submitted to the scrutiny and
judgment of the trial judge, his action thereon should be regarded

as giving further solidarity to the judgment."
618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980).

Elkington v. Foust,

Fire Insurance in its motion for new

trial or judgment n.o.v. presented the same arguments it is now
making

concerning

the alleged

excessiveness

of the

award.

In

denying the motions, the trial court stated:
I have reviewed my notes and I recall the
evidence in the regard that I am referring to
and I am not in the least persuaded that the
jury in this case overstepped their bounds in
awarding excessive general damages and punitive
damages.
On the contrary, this case, in mv
judgment, could well have resulted in greater
damages than were awarded by the jury.
[Emphasis added.]
Record 2996, at 40.
The Court has often stated the standard when reviewing
the amount of the jury's award.

The Court's comments in Wilson v.

Oldroyd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759, 764 (1954), a case involving
alienation of affections with consequent emotional distress, appear
particularly appropriate in this case:
The question of damages in such instance seems
best addressed to the discretion of a jury;
they have homes, spouses and children of their
own, are experienced in the practical affairs
of daily life, and have different points of
view; and they are afforded the benefit of
seeing and hearing the parties and their
witnesses.
Because of their advantaged
position courts are extremely reluctant to
interfere with their verdicts.
This is
necessarily so in order that the right of trial
by jury assured under our law be preserved. If
courts were prone to set aside jury verdicts
and substitute their own judgments therefore
whenever they disagreed with the jury, the
right would be abrogated and the jury system
would be but a pretense. The concept of trial
by jury necessarily presupposes that there is a
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wide area within which the pendulum of the
jury's deliberation may swing without interference from the court. And so long as they
remain within the boundaries of what reasonable
minds could believe their findings should
remain inviolate.
The

evidence

is

abundant

and

compelling

that

wrongfully and seriously injured the Crookstons.

Fire

Insurance

Even in the view

of the trial judge, the compensatory award could have been larger.
Reasonable minds without passion or prejudice could well award the
damages given here, and the compensatory damage award should therefore stand.
III.

A

*

THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE IN
VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AND NATURE OF FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE'S CONDUCT.

Elements Of Punitive Damages.
In a number of recent decisions this Court has explicitly

outlined seven elements that a jury should consider before awarding
punitive damages.

See, for example, First Security Bank of Utah v.

J.B.J. Feedvards. 653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982).
submitted a proposed jury

instruction almost

Crookstons' on the seven elements.

(R. 1391)

Fire Insurance

identical to the
Fire Insurance

simply argues that there was insufficient evidence under each
element to justify the punitive damage award.
Trial judge Dennis Frederick is a highly respected judge
with many years on the bench.

Prior to his judicial appointment,

Judge Frederick had an extensive trial practice including insurance
defense.

As ijoted above, Judge Frederick concluded that the
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members of the jury had not overstepped their bounds in awarding
punitive damages.

Judge Frederick described the actions of Fire

Insurance as pernicious:
During the course of the ten or so days that we
tried the case, it was my observation that
indeed we were dealing here with conduct which
was pernicious, pernicious not merely in the
sense of the defendant having taken und[ue]
advantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, in
treating their claim in a high-handed fashion,
but pernicious further in the sense that clear,
unequivocal misrepresentations were made by
agents of the defendant to the plaintiffs and
to their counsel, and as if that were not
sufficient, pernicious in the form of conduct
which, while it may not have been geared to
create emotional harm and suffering to the
plaintiffs, was, at the very least, in reckless
disregard of their rights by dealing sub rosa
with the bank and thereafter closing the file
and advising the plaintiffs the file, the claim
file would be closed.
(R. 2996, pp. 39-40)

The evidence upon which Judge Frederick based

his conclusion is extensive.

The following are some of the facts

which establish each element.
1.

Nature of the Wrongdoers Act.

Before its settlement with the Bank, Fire Insurance was
well aware that the Crookstons would lose their home in the event
only $27,830.00 were paid toward the approximate $49,000.00 (plus
interest) owed on the construction loan.

Fire Insurance knew that

the Crookstons had no means to pay the balance owing, since they
were depending on permanent financing to retire the construction
loan when the house was complete.

(R. 1990, Ex. 11, p. 50)

Prior

to his insurance work, Kent Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor,
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had worked as a loan officer for a bank and was generally aware of
the Bank's foreclosure rights under its deed of trust.

(R. 1942)

Both Soderquist and Clapperton were well aware that if insurance
proceeds were not timely paid, the Bank would foreclose unless the
insureds were able to pay the underlying loan.
2265)

(R. 1943, 2236-39,

Furthermore, Fire Insurance had actual knowledge that the

Bank was proceeding to foreclose on the Crookstons' property.
2277-79; Exhibit 15 p. 3)

(R.

All of Fire Insurance's representatives

acknowledged at trial that the purpose of insurance was to prevent
extreme financial hardship and loss of property that would otherwise occur but for insurance.
Fire Insurance ratified and approved all of the actions
taken by Moser, Clapperton and Soderquist.

All witnesses testify-

ing in behalf of Fire Insurance admitted that those involved were
acting within the scope of their employment and that their activities were consistent with company policy.

(R. 1888-89, 2235)

The

Pocatello regional office and the district branch claims manager
had reviewed the claims file routinely during all relevant times
and had made various communications to the adjusters.
11, 12 and 13)

(Exhibits

After the Crookstons filed a complaint with the

insurance department, the regional office denied any responsibility
to the Crookstons.
2.

(Exhibit 9 pp. 28-31)

The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding
Defendant's Misconduct.

Since a perpetrator rarely admits that he was reckless or
carried ill will toward his victim, such recklessness or ill will
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must be established by circumstantial evidence.

In view of Fire

Insurance's knowledge of the Crookstons' circumstances and the
consequences of the settlement with the Bank, there is no logical
explanation of Clapperton's actions other than ill will, malice or
total indifference toward the Crookstons.

Having sought an inade-

quate bid and having excluded the Crookstons from the negotiations,
Fire Insurance was in total control of the settlement with the
Bank.

Knowing that the settlement would have a devastating impact

on the Crookstons, Clapperton nonetheless proceeded

apparently

without a second thought.
3.

The Relative Wealth Of Fire Insurance.

Exhibit 18, Fire Insurance's 1986 financial statement,
stated that the company's total assets were $723,468,116.00 and
that its net income for the year was $23,000,000.00.
damage

award

is not

excessive, particularly

The punitive

in light of the

circumstances of this case.
4.

The Effect of Defendant's Misconduct on the
Lives of the Victims and Others.

It is difficult to imagine how any insurance company
could affect the lives of its insureds more than Fire Insurance has
affected the Crookstons.
the only victims.

However, Mr. and Mrs. Crookston are not

Obviously, Fire Insurance's actions have had a

detrimental effect upon the Crookstons' children. Mrs. Crookston's
parents who had loaned the Crookstons $12,000.00 for the construction of their home have never been repaid.

(R. 2397)

Even though

the Bank proceeded with foreclosure and repossessed the Crookstons'
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property, it still sustained a loss of up to $5,000.00.

(R. 2047)

All of the Crookstons' bankruptcy creditors are still unpaid and
the bankruptcy case remains open after six years, pending the
outcome of this case.

(R. 1864)

Subcontractors who had provided

labor and material for the Crookstons' home

(unrelated to the

collapse) were forced to file liens and commence a lawsuit to be
paid.

(Exhibit 26)

Fire Insurance failed to timely clean up the

debris, thus creating a hazard for neighborhood children, which
forced the city to seek condemnation of the Crookston property.
(R. 1981-82)
5.

The Probability of Future Reoccurrence of
the Misconduct.

Fire Insurance has never admitted wrongdoing, taken any
action to rectify the wrongs or reprimanded those who committed the
acts.

On the contrary, Clapperton, Soderquist and Moser (the only

witnesses at trial for Fire Insurance) testified that they believed
they had treated the Crookstons fairly.

(R. 1937)

In fact,

Clapperton had the audacity to expressly state that he felt good
about what he did to the Crookstons!

(R. 2286)

Fire Insurance has

twice promoted Clapperton since his adjustment of the Crookston
loss.

He is now the district claims manager supervising the

adjustment of all claims in northern Utah.

(R. 2231-32)

Mr. Moser, who has also been made a supervisor (R. 196869) , testified that the handling of the Crookstons' claim was done
according to company policy, was appropriate, and was handled in a
fashion similar to the handling of other claims.
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(R. 2588-89)

Mr. Soderquist described Fire Insurance's claims adjusting philosophy as follows:
Q:

Now, what is Mr. Moser's duty as it
relates to the loss itself? Does he have
any duty at all to try and find out on his
own what the loss is? . . .

A:

Technically and literally according to the
conditions of the policy, as I would
interpret it, Mr. Moser's only duty was to
the insurance company, which would be to
obtain information to protect the insurance company's interest. . . Any efforts
that Mr. Moser made to help the insured to
prove their loss would be beyond the scope
of his actual duties as an adjuster.

Q:

. . . Are you saying that the adjuster,
Mr. Moser, has no duty to try on his own
to determine the amount of the loss?

A:

Yes, he does, to protect the insurance
company's interests.

Q:

. . . Do you feel that Mr. Moser's duty
was in any way designed to try and protect
the Crookstons or to help them?

A:

Technically, I don't think an adjuster's
duty is to protect the interests of the
insured. I think all insurance companies
do that as a public relations matter, but,
technically they are not required to.

Q:

Was this the position taken by Mr. Moser
and you in the Crookston case?

A:

Yes.

(R. 1893-95)
Further evidence revealed that there are approximately
four claims offices in Utah, each handling approximately four to
five thousand claims per year.

There are scores of other claims
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offices throughout the western states which handle a similar number
of claims.

(R. 2587-88)

The above facts clearly demonstrate a cold, calculated
and calloused attitude that Fire Insurance has in settling its
claims.

For this reason the trial court observed:
[T]he issue here . . . is one that has to do
with the wholesomeness of the warning made to
the defendant to avoid this type of egregious
conduct in the future and to serve as such a
warning to others similarly situated, and I am
not at all persuaded that this award fails to
meet that standard.
On the contrary, it
appears to me that it will have the effect, the
desired effect.

(R. 2996, p. 42)
This Court has recognized that deterrence is one of the
primary purposes of punitive damages.
P.2d

Johnson v. Rogers,

, 90 Utah Adv. Rptr. 3, 5 (Utah 1988).

Only a substan-

tial amount, such as was awarded in this case, will provide the
deterrence value necessary to effect an overhaul of Fire Insurance's

prevailing

perspective,

philosophy,

and

devious

claims

practices.
6.

The Relationship Between the Parties.

As previously described, the loss payee provision in
favor of the Bank created a fiduciary type relationship between the
Crookstons and Fire Insurance, since Fire Insurance's negotiations
with

the

survival.

Bank substantially
Apart

from any

affected
fiduciary

the Crookston' financial
responsibility,

insurance

creates p. special relationship between the parties unlike most
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commercial contracts. Historically, neighbors and communities have
borne the consequences of a catastrophe, because of the helplessness of the victims.

In modern times, society's role has been

replaced by insurance companies and society collectively pays for
the catastrophe through premiums.
An insurance company is required to perform under its
contract only upon the occurrence of a loss, when an insured is
financially and emotionally vulnerable.

The more severe the loss,

the greater the insured's helplessness and despair.
disparity

in

resources

between

an

insurance

The enormous

company

and

its

insured, particularly in a severe loss, creates a special relationship where even the hint of fraud and oppression have absolutely no
place.
7.

The Amount Of Compensatory Damages Awarded.

The

compensatory

damages

awarded

to

the

Crookstons

(including attorneys fees and costs) have a ratio to the punitive
damages awarded of approximately one to four.

Appellant cites no

cases to indicate that such a ratio is excessive.

On the contrary,

the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have specifically
approved

higher

ratios.

For

example,

see

Terry v. Zions

Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) where,
in a malicious prosecution and false imprisonment case, a ratio of
one to six was sustained; and VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine
Distributors, Inc., 758 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a breach of
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contract and abuse of process case, where the court sustained a
ratio of one to fifty.
B.
The Jury Was Appropriately Cautioned About Awarding Punitive
Damages.
The trial court gave precautionary jury instruction No.
34 (R.1517) on punitive damages which stated:
You are instructed that punitive damages
constitute an extraordinary remedy outside the
field of usual redress remedies which should be
applied with caution lest, engendered by
passion or prejudice because of a wrongdoing,
the award becomes unrealistic or unreasonable.
The law provides no fixed standard as to the
amount of punitive damages, but leaves the
amount to the jury's sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudices, however,
the law requires that any award for such
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to
the actual damages.
The jury deliberated over a day and considered all of the evidence
and instructions, including the above caution relating to punitive
damages.

In viewing all of the evidence and circumstances of this

case, the jury's verdict was appropriate.
IV.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD.

A.
Fire Insurance Failed To Properly Raise The Constitutional
Issues Below And The Court Should Not Now Consider Such Issues.
This Court has long held that issues not presented to the
trial court are not considered on appeal.

Park City Utah Court v.

Ensign Co. , 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978) and Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah
2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971).
tional

issues

not

involving

This rule also applies to constitudeprivation

of

personal

liberty.

Pratt v. City Council of
1981).

City of Riverton,

639

P.2d

172

(Utah

Furthermore, this principle applies to review of issues

first raised in post-trial motions.

Franklin Financial v. New

Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) and Barson v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).

Fire Insurance

argues on appeal that constitutional prohibitions against excessive
fines apply in this action and that due process guarantees require
additional substantive and procedural protection in punitive damage
cases.

These arguments were first presented to the trial court in

Fire Insurance's motions for new trial or judgment n.o.v. and are
therefore not reviewable by this Court.
1.

Fire Insurance Never Sought Bifurcation Of
The Liability And Punitive Damages Issues.

Fire Insurance argues that due process safeguards require
bifurcation of the liability and damage phases of the trial, citing
its motion for separate trials.
review

of

that motion

(Appendix B, R. 923-35)

and supporting memorandum

However,

(Appendix C)

demonstrates that the relief sought in that motion is not the same
Fire Insurance is now seeking on appeal.

The Court has previously

noted that a party cannot change the theory presented on appeal
from that presented to the trial court.

Davis v. Mulholland, 25

Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970).
In its motion to bifurcate, Fire Insurance requested the
trial court to bifurcate only the first cause of action (breach of
contract) from the remaining causes of action.

(R. 931-33)

Fire

Insurance is not seeking a review of the trial court's denial of
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that motion (which order does not appear in the record) but argues
that the liability and punitive damage issues should have been
bifurcated.

Furthermore, the supporting memorandum is devoid of

reference to the supposed constitutional deficiencies which Fire
Insurance

is now propounding.

Since

Fire

Insurance

did not

affirmatively seek a bifurcation of the liability and damage issues
on the basis of alleged constitutional infirmities before trial,
the Court should not consider these issues now.
2.

Fire Insurance Did Not Seek a Higher
Standard of Evidence at Trial.

Fire Insurance asserts that the United States and Utah
Constitutions require that an award of exemplary damages be made
only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

The record

amply demonstrates that Fire Insurance did not demand a higher
standard until the hearing on its post trial motions.
If Fire Insurance desired a higher evidentiary standard
for the award of punitive damages, it should have raised that issue
either by motion prior to trial, or, at the very least, when it
submitted jury instructions to the trial court, which it did not
do.

Furthermore, and significantly, Fire Insurance's own proposed

jury instruction—which the trial court noted as being given in
substance—stated that the jury could award exemplary damages upon
a preponderance of the evidence.
Insurance

agreed

at

trial

that

(Appendix D, R, 1391)
the

evidentiary

Since Fire

standard

was

preponderance of the evidence, Fire Insurance should not now be
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permitted

to

repudiate

its prior position

and urge a higher

standard on appeal.
Even

if one were to assume that Fire Insurance had

properly raised this issue to the trial court, the Crookstons met
the higher standard.

The jury was instructed that it could award

punitive damages based upon a finding of fraud, which required
clear and convincing evidence.

(Appendix E)

Because the jury

specifically found Fire Insurance's actions were fraudulent, the
award of punitive damages met the higher standard Fire Insurance
now advocates.
3.

Fire Insurance Did Not Raise Or Obtain A
Ruling On The Application Of The Excessive
Fines Clause To This Action or The
Constitutional Standards For The Award Of
Punitive Damages And Their Amount.

Other than its post trial motions, the only pleadings
Fire Insurance filed in this action which in any way referred to
the United States or Utah Constitutions were the answer to the
Plaintiffs'

Second

Amended

Complaint

(R.

1027-1051)

and

its

response to the Crookstons' trial memorandum on punitive damages
filed

June

4,

1987—the

day

the

jury

rendered

its verdict.

(Appendix G, R. 1433-1458)
In both its Fourteenth Defense to the Crookstons' Second
Amended

Answer

(Appendix

F,

R.

1047)

and

response

to

the

Crookstons' trial memorandum (Appendix G), Fire Insurance cited the
Utah and United States Constitutions only for the proposition that
exemplary damages could not be awarded for breach of contract.
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These

references

have

no

relationship

contentions now made on appeal.

to

the

constitutional

In fact, awarding punitive damages

in a contract action was a non- issue at trial and is not contested
here since the trial court expressly instructed the jury that it
could not award punitive damages for breach of contract or breach
of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

(R. 1501,

1507)
The only reference Fire Insurance made before or during
trial to either the Utah or United States Constitutions that could
arguably apply outside the contract context was the following
sentence under the heading "Historical Context" in Fire Insurance's
trial memorandum:
This court should give consideration to the
constitutionality and propriety of allowing the
jury to award punitive damages in the case at
bar. (Appendix G, R. 1435)
Citations to two articles followed this sentence without further
comment.

A

generalized

mention

that

the trial

court should

consider the constitutionality of allowing the award of punitive
damages certainly did not put at issue the specific constitutional
arguments Fire Insurance now espouses.
Even assuming this vague reference put the matter at
issue, Fire Insurance did not obtain a ruling which is reviewable
on appeal. The only affirmative relief sought by Fire Insurance in
its response to the Crookstons' trial memorandum was a ruling on a
motion in limine with respect to the admissibility of Fire Insurance's 1986 financial stat,ejjient.
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No reference was made in this

motion in limine to the constitutional issues Fire Insurance is now
advocating.

Furthermore,

the

record

demonstrates

that

Fire

Insurance neither sought nor obtained a ruling on the matters
contained in this pleading.
The
encountered

situation
by

the

is

Court

thus
in

similar

to

the

circumstance

Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis

Management, Inc., 645 P. 2d 667 (Utah 1982) where the defendantappellant argued on appeal that the Court should consider some
public

policy

arguments which

had been

stated

as affirmative

defenses in its answer to the complaint but which had never been
argued to the trial court.

In rendering its opinion, the Court

commented:
This Court will not consider on appeal issues
which were not submitted to the trial court and
concerning which the trial court did not have
the opportunity to make any findings of fact or
law.
Id. at 672.

The failure to obtain a ruling at trial is fatal on

appeal even though the issues were raised but not argued until the
hearing on motions for new trial and judgment n.o.v.
A similar situation presented itself to the Pennsylvania
court in Ammon v. Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 361 Pa.S. 409, 522 A.2d
647 (1987).

There, the defendant sought post trial review of a

defense raised by motion but never heard by the trial court prior
to the trial.

The trial court sitting en banc on the post trial

motions refused to review the issue, stating:
A trial court en banc may not give relief on
post-verdict motions when such relief was not
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requested during trial. It was incumbent upon
Schussler to pursue further relief after no
ruling was made on his motion for judgment on
the pleadings.
For him to allow the entire
trial to pass, without again raising the
complete defense of general release until postverdict motions, results in the waiver of the
defense. (Citations omitted)
522 A.2d at 652.

Since Fire Insurance did not raise and obtain a

ruling on the constitutional issues prior to or during trial, it
has waived its right of review on appeal.
B.
The Excessive Fines Clause Of The Eighth Amendment Does Not
Apply To Civil Proceedings And Punitive Damages.
In

Ingraham v. Wright.

430

U.S.

651,

97

S.Ct.

1401

(1977), the United States Supreme Court devoted numerous pages of
its opinion analyzing the history of the Eighth Amendment and found
that its application was limited to criminal cases.
669.

Id. at 664-

The Court observed that all of its previous Eighth Amendment

decisions

involved

criminal

punishment

and

that

in those

cases

where courts had confronted claims outside of the criminal process,
the Eighth Amendment had been found to be inapplicable.

Id. at

667-669.
Fire

Insurance

attempts

to

distinguish

Ingraham

by

stating that the Supreme Court's lengthy analysis of the Eighth
Amendments

application was mere dicta and then argues that the

Eighth Amendment should apply to punitive damages without citing
any post-Ingraham case supporting its position.

In fact, courts

addressing this issue have generally held that the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to civil cases, including punitive damages.
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See for

example,

Palmer

v. A.H. Robbins Co.,

684

1984) ; Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio

P.2d

187,

217

(Colo.

Casualty Ins. Co., 189

Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 852 (1987), cert, denied,
108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn
Construction Co., 515 F.Supp.

64, 108-09 n. 129

(D.S.C. 1979),

affld. mem.. 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Unified School Dist. No.
490 v. Celotex

Corp., 6 Kan.2d

United States v.

Stanaland,

346, 629

242

F.2d

P.2d

843, 848

196, 206

(1981);

(7th Cir.

1957);

Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1967) cert, denied,
389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 43 (1967).
Fire Insurance cites only three cases in support of its
position.

All three cases were decided ]drior to Inaraham and none

of them involved punitive damages.
guished or are inapplicable.

These cases are easily distin-

In Toepleman v. United States, 2 63

F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959), the court affirmed a forfeiture under the
Federal

False

Claims

Act

and

stated in

dicta

that

the

Eighth

Amendment may prevent an abuse of the power to punish under this
Act.

Despite

impliedly,

this

comment, the

overruled

such

dicta

Fourth
by

Circuit

affirming

a

has, at
trial

least

court's

holding that the excessive fines clause applies to criminal cases
only.

See Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Construc-

tion Co. , 515 F.Supp.

64, 108-109 n.

129

(D.S.C. 1979), aff'd.

mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981).
Fire Insurance's use of Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 92 6,
104 N.W.2d 684 (1960) is inappropriate.
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In Abel, the court held a

statute allowing treble damages unconstitutional based on the state
constitution, which required all penalties to be used for school
purposes.

Since Nebraska law did not permit punitive damages, any

amount in excess of the compensatory damages would constitute a
penalty.

The statute in question allowed treble damages to be

awarded to the injured party, and was therefore in violation of the
state's constitution.

The Eighth Amendment and excessive fines

were not at issue.
The final case cited by Fire Insurance, Keller v. Keller,
52 Wash.2d 84, 323 P.2d 231 (1958), involved an appeal from a
suspended sentence of six months in jail for contempt.

In passing,

the court commented that a trial court's discretionary powers in
contempt proceedings may be limited by the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines, but
such limitation was not at issue.

Id. at 235.

The United States Supreme Court has yet to alter its
holding in Inaraham.
813,

106 S.Ct. 1580

In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
(1986), the insurer challenged a punitive

damage award based upon due process and other alleged constitutional violations.

The Lavoie court reversed the judgment on other

grounds and refused to address the constitutionality of punitive
damages.

The United States Supreme Court also granted certiorari

in Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
108 S.Ct. 1645 (1988).

U.S.

,

In this case, Banker's Life refused to pay

disability benefits of $20,000.00 and the jury awarded 1.6 million
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dollars in punitive damages.

Banker's Life's constitutional attack

on punitive damages closely paralleled the arguments advanced and
authorities cited by Fire Insurance in the present case.
Fire

Insurance has done

Just as

in this case, Banker's Life failed to

properly raise the constitutional arguments in the trial court, and
the United States Supreme Court refused to address the constitutional issues.
Since

issuing

the

Banker's

Life decision, the United

States Supreme Court has denied petitions for writ of certiorari in
numerous cases challenging the constitutionality of exceptionally
high punitive damage awards, ranging in size up to ten million
dollars.

In Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n,

189 Cal.App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1987) cert, denied,
U.S.

, 108 S.Ct. 2023 (1988), the Court refused to

consider an appeal from a five million dollar punitive damage award
based upon the insurance company's "bad faith."

The California

Appellate Court had considered the constitutionality issue and had
ruled that the Eighth Amendment applied only to criminal actions
and that the punitive damage award was not an excessive fine, even
though the fine under the criminal code for similar conduct would
have been only $500.00.
In
817

(D.Kan.

denied.

234 Cal. Rptr. at 851.

O'Gilvie v. International Platex, Inc.,
1985), mod.

821 F.2d

U.S.

1438

609

F.Supp.

(10th Cir. 1987), cert.

, 108 S.Ct. 2014 (1988), the

Supreme Court refused to consider a constitutional challenge to a
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$10 million punitive damage award in a case involving toxic shock
syndrome.

For similar rulings see Atlantic Richfield v. Nielsen,

unpublished

opinion,

Civil

No.

473779, Superior

Ct.

San

Diego

County, Calif., Appeal No. 003945, Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. (Jl. 6,
1987, mod. Jl. 31, 1987), cert, denied,
108 S.Ct. 2023
punitive

U.S.

(1988), where 3.5 million dollars was awarded in

damages

for

intentional

concealments;

National Life &

Accident Insurance Co. v. Miller, 484 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1985), cert.
denied,

U.S.

, 108 S.Ct. 2007 (1988) based upon a

bad faith claim resulting in an award of $2,500.00 actual damages
and $350,000.00 punitive damages; Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Campbell,
485 So.2d 312 (Ala. 1986) cert, denied,

U.S.

,

108 S.Ct. 2007 (1988), relating to intentional misrepresentations
about

a

condition

$350,000.00;

of

Sliman v.

a

vehicle,

Aluminum Co. of

(Idaho 1986) cert, denied,
(1988)
damages

where

defendants

resulting

from

resulting

America,

U.S.
were
an

assessed
exploding

Associates, Inc. v. Coty, 546 A.2d
U.S.

196

in

an
731

award
P.2d

of
1267

, 108 S.Ct. 2013,
$300,000.00
bottle

cap;

in
and

punitive
Ramsey

(Vt. 1988) cert, denied,

, 108 S.Ct.

2903

(1988) where

$388,000.00 in punitive damages were assessed against the defendant
for maliciously establishing a pig farm next to plaintiff's motel
(the Vermont Supreme Court expressly held that the Eighth Amendment
applied only to criminal penalties).
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Even if this Court were to assume that Fire Insurance
properly raised in the trial court a constitutional challenge based
upon the Eighth Amendment, there is no sound case precedent for its
position.

In any event, the punitive damages awarded in this case

were not excessive under the circumstances, as discussed above.
Co

Fire Insurance Has Not Been Denied Due Process.
1.

Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Component
of Civil Law.

Punitive damages serve an indispensible social function.
First, they punish injurious behavior which is not criminal but is
nonetheless

motivated

by

malice

or

reckless

disregard

for

the

rights of others, thereby marking the outer limits of socially
acceptable behavior.

Second, they impose a punishment commensurate

to the egregiousness of the conduct as well as the damage to the
particular
conduct.

victim,

thereby

taking

the

profit

out

of

wrongful

Third, they warn other potential wrongdoers that society

does not tolerate unacceptable behaviors, thereby deterring future
anti-social conduct.

Fourth, they provide incentives for civil

enforcement of society's norms, thereby multiplying the potential
for improved social responsibility.
to express

Fifth, they provide an avenue

society's outrage, thereby discouraging

private ven-

geance.
Punitive
controlling
Damages:

damages

anti-social

are

undeniably

conduct.

a

powerful

Mailer & Roberts,

tool

in

"Punitive

Toward a Principled Approach," 31 Hast L.J. 639, 643-650

(1980).
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2.

Fire Insurance Failed to Propose an Alternative Standard for the Award of Punitive
Damages.

The trial court instructed the jury on the standard for
the award of punitive damages in Instruction No. 3 3 (Appendix H ) .
This was the same standard proposed by Fire Insurance.
D) .

(Appendix

Furthermore, the trial court gave a precautionary instruction

on punitive damages.

(Appendix I, R. 1517).

Now dissatisfied with

the verdict, Fire Insurance asserts that the very standards it
proposed

to

the

trial

court

were

too

vague

and

violated

due

process.
On appeal, Fire Insurance is highly critical of punitive
damages

claiming

standards.

that

they

are

based

upon

vague

and

unclear

Yet, with the exception of advocating a higher standard

of proof, Fire Insurance proposes no alternative standard or basis
for the award of punitive damages.
3.

The Trial Court Gave the Jury Sufficient
Instruction.

The

basis

for much

of

the

popular

criticism

against

punitive damage relates to the vagueness of the standards for the
award.
is no

For example, critics complain that in some states (1) there
relationship

between

the

amount

of punitive

damages

and

compensatory damages or (2) punitive damages may be recovered for
gross negligence.

See Schmidt v. American Leasco, 139 Ariz. 509,

679 P. 2d 532, 535 (1983) (jury allowed to award punitive damages
without

consideration

of

compensatory

damages)

and

Valdez v.

Cillessen & Son, Inc.. 105 N.M. 575, 734 P.2d 1258 (1987) (punitive
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damages in case

of gross negligence).

having such vague standards.
jury

that the punitive

Utah is unlike those states

The trial judge here instructed the

damage

award must bear

some

reasonable

relationship to the compensatory award:
The law provides no fixed standard as to the
amount of punitive damages, but leaves the
amount to the jury's sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice, however,
the law requires that any award for such
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to
the actual damages.
(Appendix I)

Furthermore, the jury was instructed that it could

award punitive damages only if Fire Insurance acted intentionally
with malice or in reckless disregard of the Crookstons' rights.
(Appendix H)
Allowing a jury the discretion to determine the amount of
damages
process.

when

jury

judicial
expresses

guidelines
the

does

conscience

not
of

violate

due

the

community.

Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510, 519, 88 S.Ct.

1770, 1775

(1968).

A

given

Unduly restricting a jury's discretion in awarding damages

would essentially deny a party's right to jury trial.

Community

values cannot be reduced to a formula without affecting the jury
system:
. . . [T]he inherent lack of predictability of
jury decisions does not justify their condemnation.
On the contrary, it is the jury's
function to make the difficult and uniquely
human judgments that defy codification and that
n
buil[d] discretion, equity and flexibility
into a legal system.
McCleskv v. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1777 (1987).
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Fire Insurance argues that criminal

standards should

apply to punitive damage cases. Yet, criminal standards are not as
rigid as Fire Insurance seems to imply.

First, a wrongdoer has no

right under the due process clause to know with certainty the cost
of his misconduct.

See Smith v. Wade. 461 U.S. 30, 50, 103 S.Ct.

1625 (1983).

Second, the law accords the trial court discretion in

sentencing.

See for example, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189,

96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 et. sea. (1988
Supp.).

Finally, the flexibility given a jury allows individual-

ized punishment commensurate with the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct and with his wealth.

As Blackstone noted in 1768:

The quantum, in particular of pecuniary fines
neither can, nor ought to be, ascertained by
any invariable law. The value of money itself
changes from a thousand causes; and, at all
events, what is ruin to one man's fortune, may
be a matter of indifference to anothers . . . .
Our statute law has not therefore often
ascertained the quantity of fines, nor the
common law ever.
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, 377-78 (1768).
4.

Criminal and Civil Penalties Are Complementary
But Not Interchangeable.

Fire Insurance suggests that the punitive damage award is
excessive in light of Utah statute which provides for a fine of
$10,000.00 for corporate misconduct.
many reasons.

Such a comparison fails for

First, Fire Insurance fails to consider that there

are numerous punishments under the criminal code that would relate
to corporate misconduct.

For example, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

201(2) (1988 Supp.) a court has authority, in ciddition to imposing
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fines, to dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license or
impose any other civil penalty.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303

(as amended), a court can require appropriate publicity of criminal
conviction and can force the removal of a managerial or executive
officer of a corporation for up to five years. Further, under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602(ppp) and § 76-10-1603.5(5)

(1988 Supp.),

the court can impose restrictions upon a corporation's activities
and

can

even

corporation.

order

the dissolution

or reorganization

of the

In addition to the above, the insurance commissioner

may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew an insurer's license or
certificate of authority because of violations under the Claims
Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 et seq. (as amended) .
See also Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-308 (10) , (11), and (12) effective
through December 31, 1987 (as amended) .

tn light of all of these

penal remedies, the punitive damage award in this case is not
disproportionate.
Second, criminal and civil penalties have historically
worked hand in hand to punish and deter wrongful conduct.

The

legislature has expressly recognized treble damages in addition to
criminal penalties for certain wrongful conduct.

See for example

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919(1)(b) (as amended).

The legislature

expressly recognized this concept in § 76-3-201(2)

(1988 Supp.)

which states:
This chapter [sentencing] does not deprive a
court of authority conferred by law to . . .
impose any other civil penalty.
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See also Johnson v. Rogers,
Rptr. 3, 4-5

P.2d

_

, 90 Utah Adv.

(1988) where this Court expressly endorsed punitive

damages in addition to the defendant's criminal penalties; United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05, 67
S.Ct.

677,

$700,000.00
maximum

(1947)

would

not

criminal

$5,000.00;
S.Ct.

702

and

615

where
be

fine

the

Court

excessive
for

the

held

that

a

punishment

even

though

the

conduct

was

only

underlying

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

(1984)

where

the

Corp.,

Court

fine

464 U.S.

considered

of

238, 104

whether

a

$10,000,000.00 punitive damage award was preempted by a federal law
authorizing a maximum civil fine for such conduct of $25,000.00.
Justice

Powell

in his dissent

argued

that by

establishing

the

maximum fine, congress intended thereby to achieve both punishment
and

deterrence.

recognizing

A

that

a

majority
large

of

the

punitive

smaller prescribed fine, stating:

court

damage

rejected
award

this

view

compliments

a

"The award of punitive damages

in the present case does not conflict11 with the federal remedial
scheme.

464 U.S. at 257.
Third, Fire Insurance's analysis fails to recognize that

using criminal penalties for measuring punitive damages is unworkable.
a

part

For individual defendants, imprisonment as well as fines are
of the

criminal

penalty.

damages to the loss of freedom?

How can one equate

punitive

As described above, there are

numerous criminal penalties available to the court such as negative
publicity about the conviction, restriction of business activities,
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restraining

orders,

revoking

dissolution of a corporation.

licenses,

and

reorganization

or

How can a punitive damage award be

compared to these penal remedies?

Is there some monetary value for

the stigma of criminal conviction or the loss of voting rights and
other rights that a criminal penalty would entail?

Another problem

with this approach is determining what criminal action, if any, is
analogous to the defendant's wrongful conduit.
A defendant such as Fire Insurance can gain enormous
profits by engaging in wrongful conduct where there is little
likelihood of criminal prosecution.
and

relatively

modest

financial

The prospect of an occasional
penalty

will

not

deter

such

conduct.
After careful analysis of Fire Insurance's position, it
is easy to see why courts have refused to accept the arguments Fire
Insurance has advanced.

The civil and criminal systems play

important, but different, roles in regulating undesirable social
behavior.

The Crookstons maintain that the present system need not

be altered and there are sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse.3

J

The extensive criticism of punitive damage awards getting out
of hand does not appear to have the empirical foundation to support
the critical generalities. See for example, Johnston, "Punitive
Liability:
A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law," 87
Col.L.Rev. 1385, 1387 n. 8 (1987), the author states that an
American Bar Foundation study "sharply contradicts the impression
given by anecdotal evidence that staggering punitive damages are
frequently awarded."; and Prentice, "Reforming Punitive Damages:
The Judicial Bargaining Concept," 7 Rev. Litigation, 113, 123,
(1988) where the author states, "No doubt there is some substance
to these claims, though the reports of a litigation explosion, like
Mark Twain's death, have been greatly exaggerated, and the insurance crisis is, at least in part, an invention of the insurance
industry."

If reform in the area of punitive damage is needed, such should not
be done by the judiciary.
5.

Any Change in the Law of Punitive Damages
Should Be Accomplished Through Legislation.

Punitive damages are so intertwined with the civil and
criminal systems that judicial reform on a case by case basis over
a period of many years is not a workable approach.
can balance the competing

The legislature

interests, addressing both tort and

criminal reform, since adjusting punitive damages may also require
an adjustment to the penal system.
inactive on this issue.

Legislators have not been

In the past two years, the Utah Legisla-

ture has passed major tort reform legislation and the 1988 legislature formed a Joint Committee on Tort and Insurance Reform to make
recommendations on subjects including punitive damages.

A change,

if needed, is best handled by legislation.
V.

THE CROOKSTONS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND THE AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE COURT WAS BASED
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

A.
Attorneys' Fees Are Awardable In Actions For Fraud And Bad
Faith.
The jury found Fire Insurance liable to the Crookstons
for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and bad
faith.

After the jury had been dismissed, the trial court con-

cluded that the Crookstons were entitled to attorneys fees:
It is my view in light of the verdict that has
been returned to this court by the jury, that
attorney's fees are awardable under the
intentional tort causes of action, which have
been determined favorably to the plaintiffs.
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(R. 2742) .

The trial court's ruling that Crookstons are entitled

to attorney's fees was based on this Court's decision in American
States Insurance Co, v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042, 1044
(1971) wherein the Court stated:
Before an award of attorney's fee could be made
in the declaratory judgment action, it must
appear that the insurance company acted in bad
faith or fraudulently or was stubbornly
litigious.
Although the trial court expressly awarded attorneys fees
on the basis of fraud, the trial court's decision is additionally
supportable on the bad faith claim.

This Court has previously

noted that:
The appellate court will affirm the judgment,
order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent
on the record, even though such ground or
theory differs from that stated by the trial
court to be the basis of its ruling or action .
(Goodsel v. Department of Business
Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974)
(quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1464(1)).
In Beck, supra, the Court recognized that a breach of an insurer's
implied duty of good faith could result in foreseeable consequential damages including attorneys fees necessary to pursue the
insured's claim.
ciple.

Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the prin-

See, Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,

746 P.2d 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and Zions First National Bank
v. National American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988).
B.
The Trial Court's Award Was Based On Substantial Evidence And
Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion.

This

Court

has previously

held

that, "The award of

attorney,s fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse
of that discretion."
1982).

Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah

Fire Insurance claims that Judge Frederick abused his

discretion,

citing

Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n,

657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982) and Sharp v. Hui Wahine, Inc. . 49 Haw.
241, 413 P.2d 242 (1966).

Although these two cases state valid

principles, neither is applicable to this case.
In Mueller, two plaintiffs had failed in their claims and
the defendant was awarded attorneys fees.

The trial court divided

the responsibility for payment of fees equally between the two
plaintiffs on the basis of an off-hand comment made by the attorney
for the defendant that he had worked about equally defending
against the two plaintiffs7 claims.

The trial court ignored the

stipulated detailed billing records which had been submitted to the
court for its review.

On appeal, this Court reiterated its prior

holdings that in order for the award to be reasonable it must be
based on evidence, citing Sharp.
In Sharp, the Hawaii Supreme Court overturned the award
of attorney's fees awarded in a foreclosure action.

In that case,

counsel for the prevailing party claimed that a 15 percent contingency fee was reasonable per se and failed to present any evidence
as to the amount of work which the attorney had actually invested
in the case.

The Hawaii court held that the trial court could not
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award attorney's fees on counsel's self-serving opinion.

The Sharp

case does not stand for the proposition that an attorney cannot
testify concerning facts material to the work he performed and the
factors relevant to the award of a reasonable attorneys fee.
In awarding the fee in this case, the trial court was
guided by the factors set forth in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d
622 (Utah 1985).

There, the Court stated:

Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured by
what an attorney actually bills, nor is the
number of hours spent on a case determinative
in computing fees. In determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees, a trial judge may
take into account the provision in the Code of
Professional Responsibility which specifies the
elements that should be considered in setting
reasonable attorneys fees*
Utah Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106. A court
may consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services, the amount
involved in the case and the result attained,
and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved.
Id. at 624-625. In support of the Crookstons' claim for attorney's
fees, counsel for the Crookstons, L. Rich Humpherys, submitted an
affidavit stating facts relevant to the criteria set forth in
Cabrera and attached thereto a detailed description of the work and
accounting of the time spent in pursuing the Crookstons' case.
2773-2800)

In addition, counsel

(R.

for Fire Insurance took Mr.

Humpherys' deposition, cross-examining Mr. Humpherys on the details
of the statements made in his affidavit.
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(R. 2997)

After consi-

dering

the

affidavit,

the

deposition,

and

the

oral

argument

presented by counsel, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

(Appendix J, R. 2964-67)

These findings of fact and conclusions of law were not
based upon mere speculative opinion.

Mr. Humpherys fully detailed

the number of hours worked on the case, the experience he had had
in pursuing these types of cases, and the loss of business which he
had incurred as a result of pursuing this claim.

The trial court

was aware of the size of the award and the complexities of the
case.

The trial court was fully advised as to all the factors to

be considered and based on the evidence presented rendered his
decision concerning the fees.

The case is not remotely similar to

the Mueller or Sharp cases where the fee awards were based merely
on off-hand comments of counsel not based on pertinent facts.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse his discretion, and the
award should stand.
C.
Fire Insurance Has Waived Its Right To Contest The Number Of
Hours Devoted To The Case.
On December 14, 1987, the trial court heard oral argument
on post trial motions including the Crookstons' motion for the
award of attorney's fees.

(R. 2996)

During the course of that

argument, counsel for Fire Insurance made the following statement:
Insofar as the attorney's fees are concerned,
your Honor, what I elicited in that deposition
was that Mr. Humpherys and Mr. Klemm had
approximately 1,000 hours and I tell Mr.
Humpherys and I represent to the Court that we
do not quarrel with the amount of time represented in that bill.
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(Record 2996 p. 34)

After the trial court had taken the motion

under advisement, counsel for Fire Insurance forwarded a letter to
the court in which counsel made the statement, "We do not quarrel
with the amount of time expended by Mr. Humpherys."

(R. 2958)

Fire Insurance now contends that a portion of the time on
the billing summary submitted to the tri^l court was attributable
to claims against Rocky Mountain State Bank and that the time is
not appropriately chargeable to Fire Insurance.

This is a conten-

tion being raised for the first time on appeal and under well
settled rules of appellate review should not be addressed by the
Court.

Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1979).
Even if this Court were disposed to consider the claimed

impropriety, it appears that the trial court has already addressed
the issue. The Crookstons' motion for attorney7s fees requested an
award of $200,000.00.

(R. 2771)

The trial court reduced the

requested amount by $25,000.00 or approximately one-eighth.

This

roughly equates with the time attributable to the Rocky Mountain
State Bank claim reflected on the billing summary submitted by Mr.
Humpherys to the trial court.
requested

award,

Fire

Since the trial court reduced the

Insurance's

contention

attorney's fees were awarded is not well taken.
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that

excessive

VI.
A.

THE CROOKSTONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY CONTRACTUAL
LIMITATION.

Contractual Limitations Do Not Apply To Tort Claims.
The very terms of the limitation confine its application

to

actions

"on the policy."

In construing

similar

limitation

provisions, courts have held that these limitations do not bar tort
claims.

See, for example, Asher v. Reliance Insurance Co., 3 08

F.Supp. 847 (N.D.Cal. 1970) and Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. , 545

F.Supp.

370

(D.Nev.

1982).

Accordingly,

the

policy

limitation has no bearing or effect on the jury's findings that
Fire

Insurance

Exchange

defrauded

and

intentionally

inflicted

emotional distress upon the Crookstons.
B.
The Policy Limitation Does Not Bar The Crookstons7 Claim Of
Bad Faith.
1.

The Limitation Is Unenforceable As A Matter
Of Common Law.

This Court has at times upheld contractual limitations in
the

absence

of

extenuating

circumstances; however,

it has

also

strongly expressed its view that such limitations are " . . . looked
upon with disfavor."

Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

583 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1978).

Although the Court has not hereto-

fore considered the enforceability of a contractual limitation when
interposed as a defense to insurer bad faith, it has cited cases
wherein the insureds bad faith rendered the limitation unenforceable and announced principles pertaining thereto.
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In Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co,, 595 P.2d
863 (Utah 1979), the Court held that an insurance company's failure
to deliver a copy of an insurance policy to its insured precluded
the

insurer

from

relying

on a contractual

limitation, citing

Lanier v. Coastal States Life Insurance Co, , 106 Ga. App. 802, 128
S.Eo2d

550

(1962).

In Lanier, the Georgia court noted that

although mere failure to pay a claim would not be sufficient to
waive a contractual limitation, something more, such as an act
which

gave

evidence

that

the

insurer

was not

fulfilling

its

obligation of utmost fair dealing, would render the limitation
unenforceable•
In Beck, supra, the Court upheld the validity of a cause
of action for first party bad faith and outlined the elements of
the cause of action and its remedies.

During the discussion, the

Court cited Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 53 N.J.
313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969), a case specifically treating the enforceability of a statute of limitations in an action for bad faith. In
Bowler, a disability insurer without just cause terminated disability benefits to the insured, an unschooled individual.

When

the insured filed an action on the policy, the insurer defended on
the applicable limitations statute.
While considering the insurer's claim that the cause of
action was barred, the New Jersey court noted that insurers enjoy
many privileges under the law and have an obligation to deal fairly
with their insureds.

Furthermore, the court observed that insur79

ance policies are prepared by the company's experts and that there
is no

arms

length bargaining which characterizes

between equals in the market place.

negotiations

Thereafter, the court stated

that, "[t]he slightest evidence of deception or overreaching will
bar reliance upon time limitations for prosecution of the claim,"
and that "conduct incompatible with the insurer's obligation to
exercise good faith in dealing with its insured [in] and of itself
creates an equitable estoppel against the plea of the statute of
limitations."

[Emphasis by the court].

Id. at 588, 589.

For

additional cases with similar holdings, see Diamon v. Penn Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 247 Pa.S. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977) and Leone
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 599 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1979).
While this Court in Beck did not cite Bowler for the
precise issue at bar, Bowler is consistent with principles announced in Beck.

The Court stated in footnote 4 that:

The duty to perform the contract in good faith
cannot, by definition, be waived by either
party to the agreement.
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801.

The Court subsequently alluded to the non-

waiverability of the implied duty of good faith in Zions First
National Bank v. National
651 (Utah 1988) .

American Title Insurance Co.,

749

P.2d

There, the Court observed that attorneys fees

would be available to an insured in an action for breach of the
duty of good faith despite contrary policy provisions because the
implied duty of good faith was non-waiverable through contract.
Similarly, Fire Insurance Exchange's policy provision ostensibly
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limiting pursuit of a bad faith claim to a period much shorter than
that otherwise mandated by statute constitutes

an

impermissible

attempt by Fire Insurance to contractually limit its implied duty
of good faith.
2.

The Policy Provision Is Unenforceable As A
Matter Of Utah Statute.

Fire Insurance argues that its one year limitation was
permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-19
Code Ann. § 31A-21-313
restricts a contractual

(1953)

[repealed].

Utah

(1986), which repealed the prior statute,
limitation

period not less than three years.

in an

insurance policy to a

Under Utah law, a limitation

does not affect the claim or cause of action but only the remedy.
Rhoades v. Wright. 622 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 1980); cert, denied, 454
U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 397 (1981).

Since a limitation only prevents

one from pursuing his claim, the limitation is "procedural" and not
"substantive."

Rhoades. 622 P.2d at 349.

The Court has held that procedural statutes enacted after
a suit has been commenced apply not only to future actions, but
also to pending actions as well.

Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick

Brady Systems. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986) and State Department
of Social Services v. Higgs. 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982).

Since the

procedural law permitting a one-year limitation has been replaced
with a statute disallowing any limitation less than three years,
the three-year limitation now applies and Crookstons' filing was
timely.
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3.

The Crookstons Timely Filed Under Statutory
Tolling Provisions.
a.

The Crookstons had until January, 1984 to file
this action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40
(1987).

Even if the one-year limitation is valid, the Crookstons
timely filed this action.
of the

On September 27, 1982, within one year

loss, the Crookstons

filed

a complaint with the Utah

Insurance Department asserting that Fire Insurance had breached the
contract and acted in bad faith in adjusting the loss.
K, Ex. 9, pp. 24-27)
2, 1982.
months

Fire Insurance replied in writing on November

(Appendix L, Ex. 9, pp. 28-31)

after

the

(Appendix

loss,

the

In January, 1983, 13

insurance depcirtment notified

the

Crookstons that it would not be able to pursue their complaint and
recommended that they file a civil action.
32)

(Appendix M, Ex. 9, p.

The Crookstons promptly filed the present action on February

10, 1982.

(R. 22-28)
Utah statute specifically provides for a situation where

an aggrieved party acts within the limitation period to seek relief
but the system rejects the complaint based on reasons other than
the merits.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987) states in relevant

part:
If any action is commenced within due time and
a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than
upon the merits, and the time limited either by
law or contract for commencing the same shall
have expired, the plaintiff . . . may commence
a new action within one year after the reversal
or failure. [Emphasis added.]

Since the Utah State Insurance Department's refusal to act was not
an adjudication on the merits, the Crookstons had one year from the
receipt of the Insurance Department's notification to file another
complaint and the February filing of this action was timely.
A contrary position under these circumstances would be
against sound policy.

The law favors alternative dispute resolu-

tion such as administrative action, arbitration, mediation, etc.
If the

tolling

statute

is inapplicable, an

insured would be

required to file an action to protect against the running of the
contractual

limitation,

regardless

dispute resolution proceedings.

of

any

pending

alternative

Consequently, if the insured did

not file an action, an insurer would have an incentive to delay
alternative dispute proceedings.

Once the matter was not resolved

within one year of the loss, the insurer could then assert the
limitation defense.

In the meantime, the insured would be under

the false impression that his or her rights were protected because
the claim was being pursued.
b.

This is clearly undesirable.

The Crookstons had until June 16, 1983 to file
this action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44
(1987).

Fire Insurance made payment under the policy on June 16,
1982.

The Exchange's payment brought into play the provisions of

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1987), which state in relevant part:
In any case founded on contract, when any part
of the principal or interest shall have been
paid, . . . an action may be brought within the
period prescribed for the same after such
payment . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
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Under this statute the Crookstons had one year from the payment on
June 16, 1982 to file their action.

Accordingly, their complaint

filed on February 10, 1983 was timely.
VII.

FIRE INSURANCE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY EITHER THE
DISMISSAL OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK OR THE
JUDGE'S DENIAL OF FIRE INSURANCE'S MOTION TO
CONTINUE.

A.
Fire Insurance Had No Vested Right To Have Rocky Mountain
State Bank Joined In The Trial Of Crookstons' Action Against Fire
Insurance.
A tort-feasor does not have an absolute right to have all
potential joint tort-feasors joined in an action.

Fire Insurance's

position on this issue is similar to that taken by a tort-feasor in
Cruz v. Montoya.

660 P.2d

723

(Utah 1983).

There, a defendant

claimed on appeal that he had been prejudiced by the fact that he
had to answer not only for his own acts but also for the acts of
defendants who had been dismissed

from the action.

rejected

stating that the contribution

the defendant's argument

This Court

statute did not require the injured party to include all joint
tort-feasors in the action.

Furthermore, the Court noted that the

number of tort-feasors brought to trial did not diminish the damage
suffered by plaintiff or the defendant's liability

for assault.

The same is true in this action.
It may ultimately be determined that Fire Insurance has a
claim in contribution against the Bank.

However, that does not

negate the jury's finding that Fire Insurance wrongfully injured
the Crookstons.
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B.
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Refusing To Grant A Continuance .
At the time of trial, this case had been pending for more
than four years. Fire Insurance had the entire time to prepare its
case and to gather all evidence of the Bank's wrongful actions.
Indeed, the trial court allowed Fire Insurance to present all of
its evidence concerning the Bank's activities and to argue that the
Crookstons' damages resulted from the Bank's actions.

The court

also instructed the jury in Instructions 25 and 37 (R. 1506, 1520)
that they could award damages only for injuries caused by Fire
Insurance.

The Bank was not present at trial to contest Fire

Insurance's assertions. What more would the Bank's presence add in
Fire Insurance's favor?

If a party at trial, the Bank would have

denied responsibility and directed blame back at Fire Insurance.
Fire Insurance was therefore not prejudiced.
The ruling on a motion to continue lies in the trial
court's discretion and this Court does not reverse the ruling
absent a showing that the trial court has abused its discretion.
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).

A review-

ing court will not interfere with matters of discretion ". . .
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess of its
authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason that its action
must be deemed capricious and arbitrary."

Peatross v. Board of

Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976).
There is nothing in the record here which even hints that the trial
court's denial of the motion was outside reason or capricious.
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C.
The Crookstons Would Be Seriously Prejudiced If This Court
Remands On This Issue,
On August 28, 1987, Utah's Commissioner of Financial
Institutions took possession of the Bank due to the Bank's insolvency.

(See Order Approving Possession, in the Matter of Posses-

sion of Rocky Mountain State Bank by Commissioner of Financial
Institutions, Civil No. C87-5743, Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, attached hereto as Appendix N) .
Under Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1(1), (1988) all actions against the
Bank are stayed unless expressly permitted by the court.

In said

insolvency proceedings, the trial court denied Fire Insurance's
motion to lift the stay on May 16, 1988.
Insurance

then

appealed

the

(Appendix 0)

court's denial, which

dismissed by this court on August 18, 1988.

Fire

appeal was

(Appendix P)

The

stay, therefore, remains in effect.
In light of the above circumstances, it is presently
impossible to have a retrial with the Bank as a party.
a remand on this issue for a new trial is improper.

Therefore,
Even if the

stay were lifted, said insolvency proceedings, with the unique law
and procedures relating thereto, would seriously complicate, delay
and prejudice the Crookstons' claim.
VIII.

THE COURT'S COMMENT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Fire

Insurance

itself admits that the trial

comment was insufficient to merit reversal.

court's

The measure of whether

a trial judge's remarks constitute error was alluded to in Bennett
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v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc..
(1966).

18 Utah

2d

186, 417

P.2d

761

There, the Court examined the comments of a trial judge in

context and evaluated the likelihood that the result would have
been different in absence of the remarks.

The Arizona

Supreme

Court articulated this standard in Jones v. Munn, 140 Ariz. 216,
681 P.2d 368, 373 (1984) as follows:
To constitute a comment on the evidence, the
court must express an opinion as to what the
evidence shows or what it does not show.
Inferences to be derived from the evidence are
within the sole province of the jury. However,
a case will not be reversed unless the comment
prejudiced the party who opposed it, and the
test for determining prejudice is whether there
is a reasonable probability a different verdict
might have been reached if the error had not
occurred. [Citations omitted.]
Measured against this standard, Judge Frederick's comment
certainly

does not constitute

prejudicial

error.

There

is no

reasonable likelihood that the judge's innocuous jest that he would
affirm the proposition that educated people are sometimes financially illiterate would have changed the outcome at all.
more, in Instruction No. 7

Further-

(R. 1483) the trial court carefully

instructed the jury not to consider any comment by the court which
might

indicate

any

opinion

about the merits

of

either

party's

position.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Crookstons' home collapsed on December 2, 1981.

By

July, 1982, they had lost everything and filed bankruptcy.

The

Crookstons

the

and

their

creditors
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remain

uncompensated

and

bankruptcy case remains open.

Fire Insurance has paid nothing

since the settlement with the Bank on June 16, 1982.

It is time

this litigation ends; if not, justice may be found only on paper.
Crookstons respectfully submit that the judgments below
be affirmed.

Since attorneys fees and costs are awardable under

the jury's verdict, Crookstons further seek attorneys fees and
costs incurred in this appeal.
DATED this 21st day of October 1988.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By'*£/-

^/^*&ffo*&^^**'~i

£?&* Rich Humpherys
M. Douglas Bayly^
Attorneys for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this
1988,

four true

and

correct

copies

^V

day of October,

of Respondent's

mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Frank A. Roybal
422 North Main Street
Bountiful, UT

84010

and four true and correct copies were hand delivered to:
Philip R. Fishier
Steven J. Trayner
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Tab A

THE PARTIES AND WITNESSES
LARRY & RANDI CROOKSTON - Plaintiffs and Respondents
A.

Fact Witnesses
1.

Ralph Klemm - Crookston's Attbrney

2.

Rex Stailings - Independent Contractor who
submitted a bid for $49,600

3.

Kyle Brewster - original Builder who submitted
a bid for $50,951

4.

Jimmie Jones - original Architect who submitted
a bid for $74,^)00

5.

Argen Jager - purchased Crookstonfs home from
Bank and rebuiljt

B.

C.

Bankruptcy Witnesses
1.

Phillip Harding - Crookston's Attorney

2.

Anna Drake - Trustee of Crookston's Estate

Expert Witnesses
1.
2.

Milton Beck - Adjustor for 22 years - claims
procedures)
Paul Randle - Professor of Finances, Economist
and Insurance Expert

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE - Defendant and Appellant
A.

B.

Employee Witnesses
1.

Denton Moser - Adjuster

2.

Alan Clapperton - Adjuster

3.

Kent Soderguist - Supervisor

Other Witnesses
1.

Steven Phipps - Contractor who submitted a bid for
$27,830

2•

Kent Rich - Engineer retained by Fire Insurance

ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK- Kraig Murdock - Bank Officer
APPENDIX A

TabB

7^ <

FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816]
Attorney for Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone:[801]292-1483

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L,
CROOKSTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE'S MOTION FOR
SEPARATE TRIALS

vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party
Defendants.

APPENDIX B

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge David B. Dee

-2
BERT BERRETT,
Fourth-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Fourth-Party
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named defendant, FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, by and
through its attorney, FRANK A. ROYBAL, in the above-entitled
and numbered matter and hereby respectfully moves the court
for an order of separate trials of certain claims against
this defendant set forth in Plaintiffs1 First Amended Complaint
upon the grounds that separate trials (a) will be in furtherance of convenience, (b) prejudice will thus be avoided,
(c) will be conducive to judicial economy and (d) for reasons
stated in Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Memorandum Of
Points And Authorities In Support Of Motion For Separate Trials,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended.

-3Therefore, it would be appropriate for an order directing
separate trials of certain issues against this defendant.

DATED this 10th day of December,

IK A.
Defendant
change

ttorne^
nsurance Ex-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, J'LYNNE H. WOLFLEY, hereby certify that on the
10th day of December, 1986, a copy of the foregoing Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion For Separate Trials was
properly mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
L. Rich Humpherys
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Carmen E. Kipp
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Francis M. Wikstrom
Daniel W. Hindert
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Melvin G. Larew, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1095 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105
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Stephen G. Morgan
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

John M. Chipman
Andrea C. Alcabes
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys at Law
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816]
Attorney for Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84 010
Telephone: [801]292-1483
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE'S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SEPARATE TRIALS

Defendants.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party
Defendants.

APPENDIX C
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BERT BERRETT,
Fourth-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Fourth-Party
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The material facts relevant to this action are as
follows:
1.

That plaintiffs entered into a written Proposal

and Contract with third-party defendant KYLE H. BREWSTER "to
build a residence . . . in accordance with the plans and
specifications prepared by Jimmy Jones, architect," dated
October 27, 1980, in the City of North Salt Lake, County of
Davis, State of Utah.
2.

That defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE issued

to plaintiffs a standard home owner's insurance policy no.
76 6076 00 92, dated December 4, 1980.
2.

That on or about December 11, 198 0, defendant

ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK agreed to make a construction loan

-3to plaintiffs for said residence.

That some time during the

month of January, 1981, construction commenced on an "earth
home" and was partially completed during the year 1981, and
on or about December 2, 1981, the home collapsed.
4.

That pursuant to the contractual provisions con-

tained in said insurance policy, on June 16, 1982, defendant
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE paid defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE
BANK the sum of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR
DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-SIX CENTS [$32,744.76] for said loss.
5.

That as appears from the pleadings herein, Plain-

tiff1 First Amended Complaint-raised nine [9] causes of action,
six [6] of which are directed against defendant FIRE INSURANCE
Plaintiffs1 "First Cause Of Action" alleges Breach

EXCHANGE.

of Contract, the remaining causes of action are predicated in
part or entirely as alleged consequences that resulted from
the alleged breach of contract.
6.

That plaintiffs alleged in the "Second Cause

Of Action" Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
"Fifth Cause Of Action" Acting in Concert; "Sixth Cause Of
Action" Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; "Eighth
Cause Of Action" Liability for Intentional Consequences; and
in the "Ninth Cause Of Action" Liability for Tortious Conduct.

-4POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SEPARATE TRIALS HEARD BY THE SAME JURY
ARE NECESSARY TO AVOID UNDUE PREJUDICE
TO DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE.

Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended, provides in its
pertinent part as follows:

Separate Trials. The court in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, [emphasis added]

The trial court has discretion to grant separate
trials.

Porcupine Reservoir Company v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp.,

15 Utah 2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (Utah 1964).
If plaintiffs' claims are tried all at the same time,
the jury will be asked to reach a verdict on the amount of
just compensation for the alleged breach of contract based on
the jury's own sound discretion.

However, the jury also would

r oO

-5be inundated and bombarded with opinions from plaintiffs1
experts on the subject of what they would predict the same
jury verdict should be.

It would be impossible for a

conscientious jury, which listens and weighs all the evidence, not to be improperly influenced one way or the other
in determining the damages by the evidence on the issues of
alleged breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
acting in concert, intentional infliction of emotional distress, liability for intentional consequences and liability
for tortious conduct.
The instant motion request's that the "First Cause Of
Action" of Plaintiffs1 First Amended Complaint, which arises
under contract law be tried separately from the issues raised
in plaintiffs1 Causes Of Actions Two [2], Five [5], Six [6],
Eight [8] and Nine [9], all of which are predicated in part
or entirely as alleged consequence that resulted from the
alleged breach of contract, however, if tried all at the same
time, would be extremely prejudicial to defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE.
The issues of alleged breach of contract and all of plaintiffs' other causes of action may be separated for reasons
they are not so interwoven that separation would contribute to
uncertainty and confusion of the jury.

Quite the contrary, such

-6a procedure will expedite the trial of this case and will
be conducive to judicial expedition and economy.
It is clear that bifurcating Plaintiffs1 First
Cause Of Action for breach of contract would avoid prejudicial confusion in the conduct of the trial.

POINT II
SEPARATE TRIALS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE
CONVENIENCE OF THE COURT AND PARTIES;
THERE WOULD BE MINIMAL DUPLICATION OF
EVIDENCE.

In commenting on the similar federal rule, Professor
Moore stated that an order granting separate trials is particularly advisable where the outcome of the first trial "would
make it unnecessary to try other and more complicated issues."
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5, pp. 42-54.
The court should grant separate trials for reason that
should the jury in the first trial return a verdict there was
no breach of contract, it appears there would be no basis for
all other causes of action set forth in Plaintiffs1 First
Amended Complaint, precluding the necessity of a lengthy, protracted jury trial, thereby saving judicial resources.

Rule 1

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated [1953] ,
as amended, provides in pertinent part that "These rules . . .

-7shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
19 85) , the guiding and controlling decision on the issues in
the instant case was also an action where the trial court,
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, bifurcated the case and agreed to
try the claim for failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits
independent of the claim alleging breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance contract.

CONCLUSION

In summary, it is clear that bifurcating Plaintiffs1
First Cause Of Action for breach of contract would avoid prejudicial confusion in the conduct of the trial and the court
should grant Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion For
Separate Trials in this matter for reasons and upon the grounds
stated hereinabove.

A denial of this defendant's motion would

be inconsistent with equity and justice.

Separate trials heard

by the same jury are necessary to avoid undue prejudice to
defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE and are necessary for the convenience of the court and parties; there would be minimal duplication of evidence.

-8DATED this 10th day of December, 3/986

JYBA5T7 Attorney lui De.re/Insurance Exchange

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, ANGIE WHITE, hereby certify that on the 10th day
of December, 1986, a copy of the foregoing Defendant Fire
Insurance Exchange's Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In
Support Of Motion For Separate' Trials was properly mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:

L. Rich Humpherys
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Carmen E. Kipp
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Francis M. Wikstrom
Daniel W. Hindert
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Melvin G. Larew, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1095 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105

<.•/:-

-9Stephen G. Morgan
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

John M. Chipman
Andrea C. Alcabes
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys at law
13 00 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

V 0/nn/s,
ANGIE WHI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You

are

instructed

that

punitive

damages

constitute an

extraordinary remedy outside the field of usual redress remedies1
which should
or

be applied with caution lest, engendered by passion

prejudice

because

unrealistic or

of

a

wrongdoing,

unreasonable.

the

award

becomes

Rnnh damages may br nwnrrtori whcrr

^_tho nature—ef-the—w^eftg-~eomplained—of in—the injury inflicted
^2oes_bjeYond—merely viulaLiny Lhe ilyliLa of ttnother in thai iL is"
vfound to _ha-wilftil and malic
The law provides no
punitive

damages,

fixed

but

standard

leaves

the

as

amount

to

the

amount of

to the jury's sound

discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice,

however, the

law

must

requires

that

any

award

for

such

damages

bear a

reasonable relationship to the actual damage?.
Should you find by a preponderance of the
plaintiffs "kr.e

entitled

factors to

be con^i4ered

the amount

are:

The

nature

of

to

an

award of J)unitive^damages, the

in determining

th^^ppropriateness of

[1] Tfte^relative wea^tn of the defendant; [2]
defendant's

circumstances surrounding

mi^cpilauct?

probability of

The relationship between

[3]

The

facts

and

defendant'^-IQISconduct; [4] The effect

of defendant's misconduc^tron the lives
[5] The

evidence t£ar£ the

of plaintiff

and others;

future recurrence of the Misconduct; [6]
the

parties;

actuals-damages awarded.

APPENDIX D

and

[7]

The

afrteunt of

-,i
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INSTRUCTION NO.

plaintiffs1

The
against

defendant

claim

for

fraud

and

misrepresentation

Fire Insurance Exchange has six essential

elements:
First, that adjusters for defendant Fire Insurance Exchange
made representations to the plaintiffs individually or their
agents•
Second, that one or more of these representations were
false;
Third, that the representations were known by the insurer's
agents

to

be

false

or that

the

insurer's

agents made the

representations recklessly and without regard to their truth or
falsity;
Fourth, that the plaintiffs and their agents relied on the
representations and were deceived by them;
Fifth, that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in relying on
the representations; and
Sixth, that the false representations were the proximate
cause of damages to the plaintiffs.
If you find that the plaintiffs have established each of
these elements by clear and convincing evidence, then you should
return a verdict for the plaintiffs against the defendant insurer
for misrepresentation and fraud.
If you determine that the insurance company is liable to the
plaintiffs for fraud, you shall award the plaintiffs compensatory

APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTION NO,
Page Two

damages.
following:

^o

Compensatory damages for fraud are restricted to the
(1) the

difference

in

amount between what the

plaintiffs would have received had the misrepresentations not
been made and what the plaintiffs actually received; and (2) any
resulting losses which proximately resulted from the fraud.

In

assessing resulting losses, you may consider the plaintiffs1 loss
of property, the plaintiffs1 expenses and debt associated with
loss of the property, impairment of the plaintiffs1 credit, loss
of the plaintiffs' financial reputation, and loss of plaintiffs1
income.
You may also award punitive damages in accordance with the
instruction regarding punitive damages given hereafter.
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816]
Attorney for Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone:[801]292-1483

. uPL « \ \j * L 'iN

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE'S ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFFS1 SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge David B. Dee

S. LARRY CROOKSTON, and RANDI
L. CROOKSTON, individuals,
and ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Second-Party
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C84-7061
[Consolidated]

vs.
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Second-Party
Defendants.

APPENDIX F
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BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Third-Party
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named defendant, FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, by and through its attorney, FRANK A. ROYBAL, and
respectfully answers Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint in
the above-entitled and numbered actions and admits, denies
and alleges as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

That Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against
defendant, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE.
SECOND DEFENSE
2.

That this defendant admits thfe allegations con-

tained in paragraphs one [1], two [2] and three [3] of Plaintiffs'

-3Second Amended Complaint, without admitting said paragraphs
state a cause of action.
3.

That this defendant, with respect to the alle-

gations contained in paragraph four [4] of Plaintiffs1 Second
Amended Complaint, alleges it is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of all the
allegations contained therein, therefore, the same are denied
because some of the terms are vague and ambiguous.

However,

this defendant admits its agents and employees were at all
times acting within the purpose and scope of their agency and
employment, without admitting a cause of action is stated.
4.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph five [5], having subparagraphs
[a.] through [ c ] inclusive, as set forth in the First Cause Of
Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, admits that
prior to December 2, 1981, plaintiffs entered into a contract
of insurance with this defendant, policy no. F6076 00 92, and
only those allegations which comport to the specific language
contained in said insurance policy, without admitting said
statement states a cause of action, and alleges said contract
of insurance speaks for itself; this defendant denies all other

-4allegations contained therein which are inapplicable and not
part of said policy.
5.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph six [6], as set forth in the
First Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint,
admits only that throughout the period of said policy, plaintiffs
paid the premiums and performed each act required on their part
to keep the policy in full force and effect, without admitting
said statement states a cause of action, and alleges it is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of all other allegations contained therein,
therefore, the same are denied.
6.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph seven [7], as set forth in the First
Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, admits
only that on or about December 2, 1981, plaintiffs1 home sustained
direct physical loss and that plaintiffs gave notice and that
it became obligated to pay, without admitting said statement
states a cause of action, and alleges the terms of the policy
and laws of the State of Utah speak for themselves, therefore,
all other allegations contained therein are denied because some

L> ~r £u '- ^* ^

-5of the terms are vague and ambiguous, and avers that the plaintiffs have obligations pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the policy.
7.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraphs eight [8] and nine [9], as set forth
in the First Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended
Complaint.
8.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph ten [10], as set forth in the
Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint,
realleges and incorporates by reference thereto its answers
to paragraphs one [1] through nine [9] inclusive, as if fully
set forth herein.
9.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph eleven [11] , as set forth in the
Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint,
admits only to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs
when they entered into the contract of insurance and accepted
premiums from plaintiffs, without admitting said statement states
a cause of action, and denies all other allegations contained
therein.

-610.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraphs twelve [12] , thirteen [13] , having
subparagraphs [a.] through [e.] inclusive, and fourteen [14],
as set forth in the Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1
Second Amended Complaint.
11.

That this defendant, with respect to the alle-

gations contained in paragraph fifteen [15], as set forth in
the Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, alleges it is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained
therein, therefore, the same are denied.
12.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraphs sixteen [16] and seventeen [17], as
set forth in the Second Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second
Amended Complaint.
13.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraphs eighteen [18] through thirty-two
[32] inclusive, of the Third and Fourth Causes Of Action, as
set forth in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, appear to
assert no claim against this defendant, therefore, require no
response, however, to the extent an answer may be required, all
allegations contained therein are denied.

-714.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph thirty-three [33] , as set forth
in the Fifth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its answers
to paragraphs one [1] through thirty-two [32] inclusive, as if
fully set forth herein,
15.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph thirty-four [34] , having subparagraphs [a.] through [e.] inclusive, with subparagraph [d.]
containing subparagraphs one [1] through four [4] inclusive,
as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second
Amended Complaint alleges as follows:
a.

Admits only those allegations which comport to

the specific language contained in policy no. F6076 00 92
without admitting said statement states a cause of action and
alleges said contract of insurance speaks for itself and denies
all other allegations contained therein which are inapplicable
and are not contained in said policy;
b.

Admits only that Denton Moser and Alan Clapperton

represented they did not have authority to settle the claim and
alleges it is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of all other allecrations contained
therein, therefore, the same are denied;

-8c.

Denies all the allegations contained therein;

d.

1.

Admits only the damage was $32,744.76, without

admitting said statement states a cause of action and denies
all other allegations contained therein;
2. and 3.

Admits the allegations contained therein

without admitting said statements state a cause of action;
4.
e.

Denies all the allegations contained therein; and

Admits only that on or about June 18, 19 82, Alan

Clapperton represented there had been a settlement under the
policy with the bank and denies all other allegation contained
therein.
16.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraphs thirty-five [35] , thirty-six [36],
and thirty-seven [3 7] , as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of
Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
17.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraphs thirty-eight [38] and thirtynine [39], as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of Action of
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, alleges it is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of all the allegations contained therein, therefore,
the same are denied.
18.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

-9contained in paragraphs forty [40], forty-one [41] and prayer
for judgment, as set forth in the Fifth Cause Of Action of
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
19.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraphs forty-two [42] through forty-nine
[49] inclusive, and prayer for judgment, as set forth in the
Sixth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint,
appear to assert no claim against this defendant, therefore,
require no response, however, to the extent an answer may be
required, all allegations contained therein are denied.
20.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph fifty [50] as set forth in the
Seventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint,
alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its answers to
paragraphs one [1] through forty-nine [49] inclusive, as if
fully set forth herein.
21.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraphs fifty-one [51] and fifty-two [52] as
set forth in the Seventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second
Amended Complaint.
22.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph fifty-three [53] as set forth in

-10the Eighth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its
answers to paragraphs one [1] through fifty-two [52] inclusive,
as if fully set forth herein.
23.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraphs fifty-four [54] and fifty-five [55]
as set forth in the Eighth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1
Second Amended Complaint.
24.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraphs fifty-six [56] through fiftyeight [58] inclusive, as set forth in the Ninth Cause Of
Action set forth in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint,
appear to assert no claim against this defendant, therefore,
require no response, however, to the extent an answer may
be required, all allegations contained therein are denied.
25.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph fifty-nine [59] as set forth
in the Tenth Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended
Complaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its
answers to paragraphs one [1] through fifty-eight [58] inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
26.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

-11contained in paragraph sixty [60] as set forth in the Tenth
Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
27.

That this defendant, with respect to the allega-

tions contained in paragraph sixty-one [61] as set forth in
the Eleventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, alleges and incorporates by reference thereto its
answers to paragraphs one [1] through sixty [6 0] inclusive,
as if fully set forth herein.
28.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in paragraph sixty-two [62] as set forth in the
Eleventh Cause Of Action of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
29.

That this defendant denies all the allegations

contained in the prayer for judgment against this defendant
containing subparagraphs [a.] through [d.] inclusive, of
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
30.

That this defendant, with respect to all the

allegations of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, denies
each and every allegation not herein admitted, controverted
or specifically denied.

-12THIRD DEFENSE
31.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

first affirmative defense, alleges it had a contractual right
and obligation to pay and/or make compromise or settlement
for loss or damage, if any, under the policy, directly with
the payee named on the policy as the designated Mortgagee,
defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, for an amount no more or
less than required to restore plaintiffs1 alleged property
damage to its pre-loss condition.
FOURTH DEFENSE
32.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

second affirmative defense, alleges the plaintiffs contractually assigned their rights to make any compromise or settlement to defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, in a certain
TRUST DEED dated the 11th day of December, 1980, which states
as follows:
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 8. Should
said property or any part thereof be
taken or damaged by reason of any public
improvement or condemnation proceeding,
or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in
any other manner, Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and
other payments or relief therefor, and

-13shall be entitled at its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own
name, any action or proceedings, or to
make any compromise or settlement, in
connection with such taking or damage.
All such compensation, awards, damages,
rights of action and proceeds, including
the proceeds of any policies of fire and
other insurance affecting said property,
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who
may, after deducting therefrom all its
expenses, including attorney's fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured
hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such
further assignments of any compensation,
award, damages, and rights of action and
proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may
require.
therefore, plaintiffs are barred from recovering from this
defendant.
FIFTH DEFENSE
33.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

third affirmative defense, alleges that pursuant to the
Lender's Loss Payable Endorsement, it had a contractual
right and obligation to pay and/or make any compromise or
settlement for loss or damage, if any, under the policy,
directly with the payee named on the policy as the designated Mortgagee, defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK; the
MORTGAGEE CLAUSE states as follows:

-14Loss (if any) under this policy, on
buildings only, shall be payable to
the mortgagee(s), if named as payee(s)
on the first page of this policy, as
mortgagee(s) under any present or
future mortgage upon the property described in and covered by this policy,
as interest may appear, and in order
of precedence of said mortgages. (A)
The terms "mortgage", "mortgagee" and
"mortgagor" wherever used in this rider
shall be deemed to include deeds of trust
and the respective parties thereto.
(B) This insurance, as to the interest
of the mortgagee only therein, shall
not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the
described property, nor by the use of
the premises for purposes more hazardous
than are permitted by this policy. (C)
any mortgagee who shall have or acquire
knowledge that the premises are being
used for purposes more hazardous than
are permitted by this policy or that the
premises have been vacant or unoccupied
beyond the period permitted by this
policy, shall forthwith notify this company thereof and shall cause the consent
of the company thereto to be noted on
this policy; and in the event of failure
so to do, all rights of such mortgagee
hereunder shall forthwith terminate.
(D) in case the mortgagor or owner
shall fail to pay any premium due or to
become due under this policy, the mortgagee hereby covenants and agrees to
pay the same on demand. The mortgagee
also covenants and agrees to pay on demand
the premium for any increased hazard for
the term of the existence thereof. (E)
this company shall not be liable to the
mortgagee for a greater proportion of any
loss than the amount hereby insured shall

-15bear to the whole insurance covering the
property against the peril involved,
under policies issued to, held by, or
payable to the mortgagee, whether collectible or not. (F) The policy provisions
relating to "mortgagee interests and
obligations" are specifically referred
to and made a part of this rider.
therefore, plaintiffs are barred from recovering from this
defendant.
SIXTH DEFENSE
34.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

fourth affirmative defense, alleges it acted reasonably and
in good faith in settlement with defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
STATE BANK, by reason of said bank's acceptance of settlement.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
35.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

fifth affirmative defense, alleges it could not have reasonably foreseen plaintiffs' alleged damages that may have
occurred after settlement with defendant ROCKY MOUNTAIN
STATE BANK, moreover, this defendant did nqt, nor could it
have exercised any control over said bank's conduct or its

| „ / »- « * » - <*.

-16disposition of the THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTYFOUR DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-SIX CENTS [$32,744.76] paid, therefore, this defendant cannot be responsible or held liable
for any of plaintiffs' alleged damages that may have occurred
after settlement.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
36.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

sixth affirmative defense, alleges that if in fact there was
bad faith conduct and/or fault on the part of this defendant,
which is specifically denied, nonetheless, the plaintiffs
were also guilty of bad faith conduct and/or fault in the
prosecuting, handling and management of the claims referred
to in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and as a proximate
cause of their bad faith acts and/or fault, omissions and
failure, among other things, to provide accurate, full and
complete information in a timely manner to this defendant,
which was of such a nature and degree that any recovery by
plaintiffs should be apportionately and comparatively reduced by the amount of bad faith conduct and/or fault of
plaintiffs.

/ »> i \ *

-17NINTH DEFENSE
37.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

seventh affirmative defense, alleges under the terms of the
insurance policy, plaintiffs failed to comply with certain
conditions precedent which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Requirements in case loss occurs. The
insured shall give immediate written
notice to this Company of any loss, protect the property from further damage,
forthwith separate the damaged and undamaged personal property, put it in
the best possible order, furnish a
complete inventory of the destroyed,
damaged and undamaged property, showing in detail quantities, costs, actual
cash value and amount of loss claimed;
and within sixty days after the loss,
unless such time is extended in writing
by this Company, the insured shall
render to this Company a proof of
loss, signed and sworn to by the insured, stating the knowledge and
belief of the insured as to the
following: the time and origin of
the loss, the interest of the insured
and of all others in the property,
the actual cash value of each item
thereof and the amount of loss thereto,
all encumbrances thereon, all other
contracts of insurance, whether valid
or not, covering any of said property,
any changes in the title, use, occupation, location, possession or exposure of said property since the
issuing of this policy, by whom and

-18for what purpose any building herein
described and the several parts thereof were occupied at the time of loss
and whether or not it then stood on
leased ground, and shall furnish a
copy of all the descriptions and
schedules in all policies and, if
required, verified plans and specifications of any building, fixtures
or machinery destroyed or damaged.
The insured, as often as may be reasonably required, shall exhibit to any
person designated by this Company all
that remains of any property herein
described, and submit to examinations
under oath by any person named by this
Company, and subscribe the same; and,
as often as may be reasonably required,
shall produce for examination all books
of account, bills, invoices and other
vouchers, or certified copies thereof
if originals be lost, at such reasonable time and place as may be designated
by this Company or its representative,
and shall permit extracts and copies
thereof to be made.
therefore, plaintiffs are barred from recovering from this
defendant.
TENTH DEFENSE
38.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

eighth affirmative defense, alleges under the terms of the
insurance policy, plaintiffs failed to comply with certain
conditions precedent which provides in pertinent part as
follows:

-19Appraisal. In case the insured and this
Company shall fail to agree as to the
actual cash value or the amount of loss,
then, on the written demand of either,
each shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the
other of the appraiser selected within
twenty days of such demand. The appraisers shall first select a competent and
disinterested umpire; and failing for
fifteen days to agree upon such umpire,
then, on request of the insured or this
Company, such umpire shall be selected
by a judge of a court of record in the
state in which the property is located.
The appraisers shall then appraise the
loss, stating separately actual cash
value and loss to each item; and, failing to agree, shall submit their differences, only, to the umpire. An award
in writing, so itemized, of any two
when filed with this Company shall determine the amount of actual cash value
and loss. Each appraiser shall be
paid by the party selecting him and
the expenses of appraisal and umpire
shall be paid by the parties equally.
therefore, plaintiffs are barred frpm recovering from this
defendant.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
39.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

ninth affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs did not comply
with a contract provision of limitation in the insurance
policy which provides in pertinent part that:

C

-20Suit. No suit or action on this
policy for the recovery of any claim
shall be sustainable in any court of
law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been
complied with, and unless commenced
within twelve months next after inception of the loss.
which is in compliance with §31-19-19 (c), Utah Code Annotated
[19 53] , as amended.

Plaintiffs commenced this action on or

about the 8th day of February, 1983, alleging the loss occurred
on or about the 2nd day of December, 1981.

Therefore, plain-

tiffs are barred from recovering from this defendant for failing
to commence their action within twelve [12] months from and
after the date of loss.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
40.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

tenth affirmative defense, alleges the plaintiffs acted imprudently, without reason and just cause in filing bankruptcy.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
41.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

eleventh affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs failed to
mitigate all of their alleged damages.

-21FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
42.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

twelfth affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs1 claims in
part, state and suggest there are tort duties imposed on a
contractual relationship, which is specifically denied, nonetheless, in the first-party relationship between this defendant and the plaintiffs, the duties and obligations of said
parties are contractual rather than fiduciary only, therefore,
a contract cannot give rise to a tort action and plaintiffs'
assertions are not only inappropriate, but are in violation
of the laws of Utah, Constitution Of Utah and the Constitution
Of The United States Of America.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
43.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

thirteenth affirmative defense, alleges no punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded against this defendant on the
action for breach of contract or any other cause of action;
plaintiffs' action is not an independent tort and none exist.
The duties and obligations of the plaintiffs and this defendant are contractual rather

than fiduciary.

-22SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
44.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

fourteenth affirmative defense, alleges there is no express or
implied agreement or statute that allows plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees from this defendant for breach of contract or any other cause of action; plaintiffs1 recovery, if
any, is contractually limited to actual policy benefits and
limits.
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
45.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

fifteenth affirmative defense, alleges plaintiffs lack standing to assert any of the causes of action set forth in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint because each such cause of
action is alleged therein to have arisen prior to the time
the plaintiffs filed in bankruptcy, therefore, the proper party
to assert any such causes of action is the bankruptcy trustee.
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
46.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

sixteenth affirmative defense, alleges it acted in good faith

' : ' > : -
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-23at all material times herein, and fulfilled all its requirements, pursuant to the provisions of §31-1-8, Utah Code
Annotated [1953] , as amended.
NINETEENTH DEFENSE
47.

That this defendant, as a separate and distinct

seventeenth affirmative defense, alleges some or all of the
plaintiffs1 claims are without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith, and by reason of the premises, this
defendant is entitled to, and will seek, reasonable attorney's
fees, pursuant to the provisions of §76-27-56, Utah Code
Annotated [1953] , as amended.
TWENTIETH DEFENSES
48.

That this defendant, a$ separate and distinct

affirmative defenses, alleges that if the facts prove, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover against this defendant by
reasons of accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
comparative negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
statute of limitations and waiver.

-24WHEREFORE, this defendant respectfully prays that
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint be dismissed, with prejudice, taking nothing thereby, and that this defendant be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court incurred
herein, and such other and further relief as the court deems
proper and just in the premises.
DATED this 28th day of January, 19

INK
DeiBenda
change

.L,""Attorney for
e Insurance Ex-

Defendant 's address:
4142 Riverdale Road
P.O. Box 9756
Ogden, Utah 84409

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, J'LYNNE H. WOLFLEY, hereby certify that on the
28th day of January, 1987, a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT was properly mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
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L. Rich Humpherys
M. Douglas Bayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Francis M. Wikstrom
Daniel W. Hindert
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen G. Morgan
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John M. Chipman
Linda L. W. Roth
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys at Law
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Carmen E. Kipp
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Melvin G. Larew, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1095 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105

Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Anna W. Drake
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys at Law
Beneficial Life Tower, #1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Raymond M. Berry
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816]
Attorney for Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone:[801J292-1483

-'</

•_' „ •.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,

DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL MEMORANDUM
PUNITIVE DAMAGES; AND MOTION
IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

COMES

NOW

defendant,

through its attorney, FRANK
submits

the

following

plaintiffs

ROYBAL

and

hereby respectfully

response to plaintiffs' TRIAL MEMORANDUM

PUNITIVE DAMAGES and moves
instructing

A.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, by and

the

to

court

refrain

for

an

absolutely

order

in limine

from making any

direct or indirect reference in person, by counsel, by witness,
or by conduct, of defendant's 1986 Annual Statement.

APPENDIX G
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Until the middle of the twentieth century, there was a
clear

distinction

between

the

remedies

for

breach

of a

contractual duty and the remedies for breach of a duty founded in
tort law. The reason for
remedies

lies

protect.

The

limited
bargain.
wronged

the differences

in

the

origin

law

of

contracts

interest—giving

the

of

the
is

in

the

parties

contract been performed.

position
In

he

and tort

interests each seeks to

concerned

The primary aim in measuring
party

in contract

the

with

a single,

benefit

damages

is

of

to

their

put the

would have been in had the

contrast

to

contract

law, which

focuses on the consensual agreement between the parties, tort law
is based primarily on social
interest in

being free

policy.

from certain

It

protects

a person's

types of harm.

The duties

imposed by tort law extend to the entire class of persons the law
seeks to protect rather than just the parties to the contract and
any express third party beneficiaries.
The application of a tort to conduct under the contract
occurring before
retroactive
contract

in

judicial recognition of that tort arguably is a

alteration

of

one

party's

violation

of

the

Contract

obligations

Clause, United States

Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1.
punitive damages
of the Due

under the

The imposition of

on one party to the contract may also run afoul

Process

Clause, United

States

Constitution, Fifth

r^

n

^

"It

3
Amendment;

Fourteenth

Amendment, Section

1, and the Excessive

Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, United States Constitution,
Eighth Amendment.
This

court

should

give

constitutionality and propriety of
punitive damages

allowing

the

to

jury

the

to award

in the case at bar. Duffy, Punitive Damages: A

Doctrine Which Should Be
Institute, "The

consideration

Abolished, printed

Case Against

The Constitutionality

of

in Defense Research

Punitive Damages"

Punitive

Damages,

4 [1969]; Ford,

"The

Case Against

Punitive Damages" 15 [1969].
I.
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT BE AWARDED PUNITIVE OR
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
The

plaintiffs

punitive damages

are

entitled

for breach of contract.

heretofore has not approved
breach of

not

an

award

to

exemplary

or

The Utah Supreme Court

of

punitive

damages for

contract, therefore, no punitive damages are permitted

in the case at bar.

First

Security

Bank

of

Utah

v. Turkey

Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 [Utah 1980]; Jorgensen v. John Clay &
Co., 660 P.2d 229 [Utah

1983];

Farris

v.

U.

S.

Fidelity and

Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 1015 [Or. 1978]; Purington v. South West,
566 P.2d 795 [Mont.

1977]; Continental

Nat. Bank

v. Evans, 489

P.2d 15 [Ariz. 1971]; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, Section 245 [1965];
Restatement

of

Contracts, Section

342

[1982];

Williston

on

e'3

4
Contracts, Section

1340 [Rev.Ed.,

1968]; Sutherland on Damages,

Exemplary Damages, Section 391 [4th Ed.,
Life &

Casualty Co., 405 So.2d

1916]; Lavoie

v. Aetna

310, 312 [Ala. 1979]; 405 So.2d

17, 18 [Ala. 1981]; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, No. 841601 [U.S.Sup.Ct.
Section

1985]; United

10, Clause

Amendment;

1;

Fourteenth

States Constitution, Article I,

United

States

Amendment,

Constitution, Fifth

Section

1; United

States

Constitution, Eighth Amendment; Constitution of Utah, Article I,
Section 7.
Damages recoverable for breach of contract include both
general damages, i.e., those
and

consequential

flowing naturally

damages, i.e.,

contemplation of, or reasonably
the

time

the

contract

was

those

from the breach,

reasonably within the

foreseeable by,

made.

the parties at

Beck v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 [Utah 1985]; Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 325 P.2d 906, 907 [Utah
1958]; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 145 Eng.Rep. 145 [1854].
II.
PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANT'S RELATIONSHIP ARE
CONTRACTUAL AND
A BREACH OF IMPLIED OR
EXPRESS DUTIES CAN ONLY GIVE RISE TO A CAUSE
OF ACTION IN CONTRACT, NOT ONE IN TORT.
The

Utah

Supreme

Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 [Utah
obligations

of

the

parties

Court

in Beck v. Farmers Insurance

1985] held
[plaintiffs

that
and

"the

duties and

defendant] are

5
contractual

rather

than

fiduciary.

Without more, a breach of

those implied or express duties can only give rise to
action in

contract, not

Mutual Insurance
Southwest Fire

one in

Co., 665

a cause of

tort." Duncan v. Andrew County

S.W.2d

at

18-19;

Lawton

v. Great

insurance Co., 392 A.2d 576 [N.H. 1978]; Kewin v.

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

Co., 295

N.W.2d

50 [Mich.

1980].
III.
DEFENDANT'S
CONDUCT
WAS NOT WILFUL AND
MALICIOUS, THEREFORE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY
NOT BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFFS.
There

is

no

evidence

in the record that defendant's

conduct was wilful and malicious.
claim

of

defendant's

failure

On the

contrary, plaintiffs1

to pay enough hardly constitutes

defendant was intentionally motivated by malice or that
bad motive

intended to injure the plaintiffs. Kesler v. Rogers,

542 P.2d 353 [Utah 1975]; Elkington v. Foust,
1980];

it had a

Terry

v.

Zions

P.2d 312 [Utah 1979];

618 P.2d

37 [Utah

Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605

McFarland v.

Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678

P.2d 298 [Utah 1984].
Punitive

damages

outside the field of
applied

with

because

of

usual

caution

redress

and extraordinary remedy

remedies1

which

should be

lest, engendered by passion or prejudice

a wrongdoing,

unreasonable.

constitute

Such damaged

the

award

may be

becomes

unrealistic

or

awarded where the nature of

if

6
the wrong

complained

of

in

the

injury inflicted goes beyond

merely violating the rights of another in that it is

found to be

wilful and malicious.
IV.
PLAINTIFFS1
HAVE
NO
CLAIM
FOR SEVERE
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNLESS THEY CAN PROVE
DEFENDANT'S
CONDUCT
WAS INTENTIONAL AND
OUTRAGEOUS.
Outrageous

conduct

may

only

be

found

if

the

circumstances of this case are intolerable, unusually extreme and
aggravated.
evidence

The plaintiffs must show

that

defendant

intended

distress to plaintiffs and there

by a

to

was

a

preponderance of the

cause

severe

causal

emotional

connection that

existed between defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs1 emotional
distress.

The payment of an insurance claim, which is claimed to

be insufficient

in amount,

is conduct that cannot be considered

extreme and sufficiently outrageous
emotional distress, Samms v.

to

cause

Eccles, 358

plaintiffs severe

P.2d 344 [Utah 1961].

Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to even

have the jury

consider awarding punitive damages in the case at bar.
Should the
the jury, there is
the plaintiffs

court allow

no definite

this cause
standard by

which to compensate

for the alleged severe emotional distress and the

jury should exercise calm and reasonable
any damages

of action to go to

whatsoever.

judgment in considering

An alleged insufficient payment cannot

c1

7
be construed

by any

reasonable person

as an act constituting a

breach of contract that would result in breaches of duty that are
independent

of

the

contract

and

that

give rise to causes of

action in tort.
V.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM
FOR FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION UNLESS THEY CAN PROVE BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE EACH AND EVERY
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT.
Fraud and

misrepresentation require proof by clear and

convincing evidence of each and every essential element which are
[1] That

a representation

existing material

fact;

representor either

was made;
[3] which

[2] concerning a presently
was

false;

[4] which the

(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,

knowing that he had insufficient
such representation;

[5] for

knowledge

the purpose

upon

which

to base

of inducing the other

party to act upon it; [6] that the other party, acting reasonably
and in

ignorance of

its falsity;

[7] did in fact rely upon it;

[8] and was thereby induced to act; [9] to his injury and damage.
If the
which

plaintiffs fail to prove all the essential elements,

means

if

plaintiffs, then

only

247

element

cannot

be

proven

by

the

plaintiffs have no cause of action against FIRE

INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Parrish,

one

P.2d

for
273

fraud
[Utah

and

misrepresentation,

1952];

Sugarhouse

Pace vs.

Fin. Co. vs.

Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 [Utah 1980]; Elder vs. Clawson, 384 P.2d

^

8
802 [Utah

1963]; Jones vs. Pingree, 273 P. 303, 305 [Utah 1928].
Generally, promises or expressions

are not

actionable for

fraud.

intention to perform was
though

the

promisor

perform in the future.
intention

not

to

This rule applies as long as the

made in

changes
A

good faith

his

and

at the

accompanied

made

in

by

order

actionable deceit. Berkeley Bank for Coops, v.
798, 804

[Utah 1980];

Second Restatement

and comments [1977]; W.
§109 at

time, even

mind and fails or refuses to

promise

perform

of future intention

Prosser, Handbook

the present

to mislead, is

Meibos, 607 P.2d

of Torts, Section 530
of the

Law of Torts,

730 [4th ed. 1971]; Cerritos Trucking Co v. Utah Venture

No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 612 [Utah 1982];

Hull v.

Flinders, 27 P.2d

56, 58 [Utah 1933].
The plaintiffs
convincing evidence
fraud.

Evidence

have the burden of proving by clear and

all

of

based

the

on mere

sufficient to establish fraud,
293, 294-95

["fraud is

facts

of such

Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d
nature that is must be

shown by clear and convincing proof

and

suspicion

Lundstrom

or

innuendo"];

America, 405 P.2d 339,
evidence" means
the evidence.

a higher
It is the

quoting

341 [Utah

1965].

degree of
degree of

to establish

suspicion or innuendo is not

Taylor v.

a wrong

necessary

will

not

lie

in mere

v. Radio Corp. of

"Clear and convincing

proof than preponderance of
proof which

the mind of the jury a firm belief or conviction.

will produce in

9
VI.
PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MUST BEAR A
REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO ACTUAL DAMAGES AND
THE RELATIVE NET WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT.
The

Utah

Supreme

exemplary damages must bear
damages, Bundy

Court

has

held

a reasonable

that

punitive or

relationship to actual

v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 760 [Utah

1984]; Cruz v, Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 727 [Utah 1983].
The relative net wealth

of

defendant

FIRE INSURANCE

EXCHANGE is

stated in the Annual Statement Of The Fire Insurance

Exchange of

Los

Angeles

Insurance Department

in

Of The

the

State

State Of

of

. .

California

To The

For The Year Ended

December 31, 1981. Corporate assets are not determinative of its
net worth and as such, the appropriate figure which the court may
allow the
holders,

jury to

consider is

the "Surplus

31

year"

December

current

as regards policy-

contained

statement for the year 1981 which is the

in

year of

the annual

the plaintiffs

alleged loss.
FOURTH MOTION IN LIMINE
Should
plaintiffs1
INSURANCE

the

counsel

court

to

EXCHANGE'S

find

introduce
Annual

it
at

appropriate
trial

Statement

consideration of punitive damages, then the
1981

which

is

the

plaintiffs1 counsel

year

will

of

attempt

the
to

defendant

for

the

year used

plaintiffs
introduce

to

allow
FIRE
jury's

should be

alleged

loss;

defendant FIRE

10
INSURANCE

EXCHANGE'S

inappropriate and
would

not

1986

Annual

inequitable

accurately

upon

reflect

parties, the relative wealth
circumstances surrounding

of

Statement
the

which

ground

be

such statement

the

relationship

the

defendant, the

the alleged

would

between

the

facts and

misconduct and the amount

of the actual damages awarded on December 2, 1981,
WHEREFORE, defendant FIRE INSURANCE
court

to

preclude

whatsoever,

the

hereinabove.

plaintiffs

1986

Annual

Defendant

FIRE

from

EXCHANGE moves the

introducing, by any method

Statement

for

reasons

stated

INSURANCE EXCHANGE further moves

that a mistrial be granted if such evidence is attempted.

DATED this 1st day of June, 1987.

V-.

A. BDYBAty Attorney for
Defendant Lfire Jlnsurance Exchange

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I, FRANK A. ROYBAL, hereby certify that on
of June,

1987, a

EXCHANGE'S
DAMAGES;

copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE

RESPONSE

AND

the 1st day

MOTION

TO
IN

PLAINTIFFS'
LIMINE

was

TRIAL

MEMORANDUM PUNITIVE

hand delivered to L. Rich

11
Humpherys of the firm CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, Attorneys for
plaintiffs.

•
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! * . -
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In addition to the compensatory damages, tne Crookstons
also seek an award of punitive damages against Fire

Insurance

Exchange.
Before punitive damages may be

awarded

against

Fire

Insurance Exchange, you must find the issues in favor of the
plaintiffs

and against the insurance company

and further, you

must find from a preponderance of the evidence that the insurance
company's employees' conduct was willful and malicious, or such
conduct was done with a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, the Crookstons1 rights.

If you so find, you

may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as in your
judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to Fire
Insurance Exchange for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to
others not to offend in like manner.

If such punitive damages

are given, you should award them with caution and you should keep
in mind they are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the
measure of compensatory damages.
In

determining

the

amount

of punitive

damages,

you

should consider each of the following factors:
1.

the relative wealth of the defendant;

2.

the nature of the defendant's misconduct;

3.
defendant's

the

facts

and

circumstances

surrounding

the

misconduct;

APPENDIX H
i *' > - ~ * ";

4.

the effect of defendant's misconduct on the lives

of the plaintiffs and others;
5.

the

probability

of

future recurrence of the mis-

6.

the relationship between the parties; and

7.

the amount of compensatory damages awarded.

conduct;

Punitive damages should be more than an

inconvenience

to the

defendant and their amount should be sufficient to discourage the
defendant and other companies similarly situated from doing or
repeating such misconduct in the future.

00I51G
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You

are

instructed

that punitive damages constitute an

extraordinary remedy outside the field of usual redress remedies
which should be applied with caution lest, engendered by passion
or

prejudice

because

of

a

wrongdoing,

the

award

becomes

unrealistic or unreasonable.
The law provides no fixed standard as to the amount of
punitive damages, but leaves the amount to the jury's sound
discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice, however, the
law

requires

that

any

award

for

such

damages must bear a

reasonable relationship to the actual damages.

APPENDIX I
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

L-,/- j C»* '*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiffs,
v.

Ciyil No. C83-1030

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,

Juc^ge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Award of Attorneys' Fees came
on regularly before the court on the 14th day of December, 1987
at the time of 1:30 p.m.
attorney,

L.

Rich

Plaintiffs were represented by their

Humpherys,

and

defendant

Fire

Insurance

Exchange was represented by its attorneys, Philip R. Fishier,
Stephen J. Trayner, and Frank A. Roybal.
considered

the

plaintiff's

motion,

The court, having

Affidavit

of

L.

Rich

Humpherys, Deposition of L. Rich Humpherys, memoranda filed by
the parties, together with all other information contained in the
court's file, and having further been present during the trial of

APPENDIX J

the above matter, ruled in plaintiff's favor by a Minute Entry
Ruling dated

December

22, 1987.

The court now enters its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lavf.
FINDINGS OF FAfo
1.

H. Ralph Klemm, a licensed attorney, represented the

plaintiffs as it relates to the present action from September,
1982, until approximately June, 1984.
2.

Because of a conflict of interest, it was necessary

that Mr. Klemm withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs and L. Rich
Humpherys was retained to represent the plaintiffs from June,
1984 to the present.
3.

Both

litigation
special

attorney

attorneys.

Klemm

and

HUmpherys

are

experienced

Mr. Humpherys and his law firm have

expertise, experience

and knowledge relating to the

procedures and practices of insurance companies and the area of
bad faith insurance law.
4.
parties

Because of the numerous witnesses, exhibits, number of
in

the

third

party

action,

the

factual

and

legal

complexities of the case, and the lack of significant legal
precedent, the litigation was difficult and novel, and the time
and expenses incurred by plaintiffs' attorneys were not excessive
and were reasonably incurred.
5.

At trial, plaintiffs attorneys were well prepared and

presented plaintiffs' case effectively and efficiently, using
among other things, visual aids, transparencies of exhibits on an
overhead projector, and photographs.

6.

The plaintiffs in this case were financially bankrupt

and unable to finance the litigation and pay the attorneys1 fees
without recovery.

These kinds of cases are customarily handled

on a contingency fee basis of at least one-third of any recovery.
The amount

of $175,000 represents less than 4% of the total

judgment against the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange.
7.

The amount of plaintiffs' damages claimed in this case

were substantial and the judgment obtained is one of the largest
verdicts in Utah history.
8.

In order to pursue litigation of this kind, there are

substantial expenses and costs (in addition to the court costs
customarily

allowed

under

Rule

Procedure) that are necessarily

54(d)

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

incurred and charged to the

clients as part of the attorneys1 bill, such as expert witness
fees, depositions, photocopies, photographs, trial
other miscellaneous expenses.

aids, and

In addition to the court costs in

the amount of $2,870.32 as described in plaintiffs Memorandum of
Costs and Disbursements and in the amount of $1,320 as described
in plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements,

plaintiffs

have

necessarily

and

reasonably

incurred an additional $11,126 in costs and litigation expenses.
This amount reflects a set off for the court costs otherwise
awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d).
9.
in

The amount of $175,000 for attorneys' fees and $11,12 6

necessary

litigation

expenses

are

reasonable

under

the

circumstances of this case.

00336*

CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
1.

The

amount

of

$175,000

constitutes

reasonable

and

necessary attorneys* fees and the amount of $11,126 constitutes
reasonable and necessary

litigation

expenses incurred by the

plaintiffs in prosecuting their action herein.
2.

Defendant is liable to plaintiffs for said attorneys'

i o n expenses.
expenses..
fees and litigation

/

DATED this _//#clay of^Haramber, 1 9 8 / .
BY THE//COURT:

ATTEST

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

C-rfc

H tyZCt-i HHtC4,EY
By

W

Philip R. Fishier

L»'*»,'*rt*

'si***

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

certify

that

a true

and correct

foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
REASONABLE

ATTORNEYS1

FEES was

hand

copy of the

OF LAW

delivered

REGARDING

to Philip R.

Fishier, Strong & Hanni, 6th Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah and a copy mailed to Frank Roybal, 442 North Main
Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 this

_day of December, 1987.

>'

s Ct

£/v?iYt<--^

00'
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H. RALPH KLEMM
Attorney and Counselor at Law
SU^TE 5 0 0

• CLARK L E A M I N G O F F I C E CENTER
175

SOUTH WEST TEMPLE

SALT LAKE CITY. U T A H

84101

P H O N E <801> 3 2 8 - 2 2 0 6

September 27, 1982

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The following is a summary of my representation of
Mr. and Mrs. S. Larry Crooks ton in connection with their claim
against Farmer's Insurance Company and Rocky Mountain State Bank
of Bountiful.
Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were owners of a lot located at
3745 South Orchard Drive in Bountiful, Utah. After some contact
with Mr. Jimmie L. Jones, an architect in Salt Lake City, they
decided to build an "Earth Home" on the property in accordance
with a design prepared by Mr. Jones. Mr. Kyle Brewster was retained as a contractor to construct the home.
Arrangements were made with the Rocky Mountain State Bank
of Bountiful to borrow the money to construct the home on the lot.
The bank made an initial loan of $30,000.00 and a subsequent loan
in the same amount, making a total of $60,000.00 that the bank
loaned to the Crookstons to construct the house on the property.
The house was not yet finished when the $60,000.00 had all been
distributed to the contractors on a draw basis. The Crookstons
went to the bank to obtain additional funds so that they could
finish the home. Before the bank would loan any more funds to
them, they required the Crookstons to raise $12,000.00 from other
sources and post it with the bank. This money was borrowed from
Mrs. Crookston1s parents, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Hill of Bountiful,
Utah.
With the $60,000.00 that was loaned by the bank, Mr.
Brewster had completed approximately 907o of the work necessary to
construct the home. The major work that remained to be completed
was to place dirt around the home as a energy cover and then complete some other parts of the outside of the house. When the bank
received the money from the Crookstons, Mr. Brewster was given
the authority to go ahead and finish the house.
While Mr. Brewster was placing dirt on top of the house,
probably contrary to the plans prepared by Mr. Jones, the entire
structure collapsed and the inside of the house was completely
ruined
The only thing t h a t c a n be salvaged is the foundation
to the house. All of the existing construction on the inside of
the house was destroyed.
APPENDIX K
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Farmers Insurance Company had issued a casualty policy on
the construction of the home, and they agreed that the damage to
the home was covered by the policy. The claim was being handled
by the Ogden office of Farmers Insurance Company. Three bids
were obtained by the Crookstons and myself. Mr. Pvex Stallings submitted a bid to reconstruct the premises to the previous completion
point for the sum of $49,600.00. Kyle Brewster, the original contractor, submitted a bid of $51,000.00 to restore the structure to
its condition at the time of the collapse. The construction company
operated by the architect submitted a bid of $74,000.00 for reconstruction work. All of these bids were submitted to the insurance
company.
The insurance company was unusually effective in stalling
the payment of the claim to the Crookstons. A period of 6 months
passed from the time the house collapsed until final settlement was
made. Rocky Mountain State Bank of Bountiful became very impatient
about repayment of the loan. Its representatives wanted the money
that they had advanced on the .contruction of the home. The Crookstons
had no funds to pay the amount due and were looking to the insurance
company to cover the loss on the property. The bank was putting on
pressure to obtain payments on the loan and to obtain the insurance
funds that were being paid by the insurance company.
Soon after I entered the case, there was a dispute between
myself and the bank about what was going to be done with the insurance
funds. I told them that they would not be permitted to take all of
the money payable under the insurance claim to apply against their
debt and thereby leave these young people without any way of repairing or reconstructing the home. Bank personnel represented to me
on several occasions that they had no intention of leaving these
young people without some means of reconstructing their home. No
details were discussed in this regard.
After all the bids had been submitted to the insurance
company, numerous calls were made to try to get payment of the claim.
The* company stated that it had to have its engineer look over the
bids and see if they were accurate. Company representatives obviously wanted further time to obtain a bid of their own from a contractor
who would have the opportunity to review the other bids before making
the bid for the insurance company. Apparently they obtained a bid
from Phipps Construction Company for the unbelievable low price
of $27,000.00 to repair the damage done by the collapse of the
home. However, they never notified the Crookstons or myself
that such a bid existed.
Instead, the insurance c om p an y
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x>;ent directly to the Rocky Mountain State Bank of Bountiful and
negotiated a settlement of the Crookston claim for $27,000.00.
The bank applied $5,000.00 of that amount to accrued interest and
$22,000.00 to the construction loan, leaving the Crookstons with
an additional debt of approximately $28,000.00 payable to the bank
on the construction loan.
It should be remembered that the insurance company had
three bids in its possession, two of which were around $50,000.00.
The settlement that was made with the bank was made without the
knowledge of the Crookstons or their attorney. On the very day
that the settlement was made, the Crookstons attorney called the
insurance company and was told that the company wasn't quite ready
to negotiate a settlement of the Crookston claim. Neither the
Crookstons nor the attorney were invited to participate in the
settlement in any way. Both the bank and the insurance company were
well aware that the Crookstons were represented by an attorney who
was working on the claim in their behalf.
Late in the afternoon of the day of the settlement, the
insurance company and the bank announced to the attorney that they
had settled the claim and that the Crookstons had nothing to say
about it.
The only way the Crookstons could get out of the terrible
mess that the insurance company and the bank left them in was to
take out bankruptcy, which they did about two months ago. The
bank obligation has, of course, been liquidated by the bankruptcy.
The bank was the real loser in the settlement that was made.
After they filed bankruptcy, the Crookstons agreed to convey
ownership of the lot to the bank to partially satisfy the amount
owing under the Trust Deed. For sotne unknown reason, the bank has
refused the tender of the deed to this date. It appears that they
want to go ahead and foreclose on the lot and obtain title the
hard way.
The settlement of the Crookston claim by the bank and the
insurance company under the circumstances stated above was the
most aggravated case of insurance misconduct that this writer has
seen in 26 years of law practice. While it is true that the Trust
Deed signed' by the Crookstons provides for any casualty loss to
be paid to the bank for application against the loan obligation,
the settlement of the case without knowledge to the Crookstons
for little more than one-half of the actual loss is unconscionable.
The bank has received its just rewards by having to write off as
a loss most of the remaining loan. But the insurance company is
the real culprit in this whole affair. The company obtained a bid
from a contractor who knew that he would never be hired to rebuild
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the hone at the price that he stated in his bid. It is doubtful
that the contractor even visited the scene of the Crookston
construction. The bid was obviously obtained by the insurance
company with the idea of depriving the Crookstons of the benefits
available under the policy.
I suppose the Crookstons have a good lawsuit against the
bank and the insurance company for fraud, misrepresentation and
conspiracy under the circumstances set forth above. Only their
lack of funds at the present time prevents them from bringing that
suit. We hope the insurance commissioner can assist them in some
way in resolving this matter without the need for such a lawsuit.
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Farmers Insurance Group

OF

COMPANIES

2500 S FIFTH AVENUE • POCATELLO IDAHO 83201
MAILING ADDRESS P O BOX 4820

November 2, 1982

State of Utah
Departnent of Insurance
326 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attn:

Re:

David G. Pearson
Exaniner

Your Pile No:
Insured:
Date of Loss:

012323
Larry Crookston
12/2/31

Dear Mr. Pearson:
Thank you for your letter of October 15, 1982.
Vfe would like to respond to Attorney E. Ralph Klenm's
allegations of September 26, 1932. Below is a list of his "
allegations and our responses to them in chronological order.
*1 Allegation - The entire structure collapsed and the inside of
the house was completely ruined. The only thing that can be
salvaged is the foundation of the bouse. All of the existing
construction on the inside of the house was destroyed.
Response - This allegation is not correct. The entire
structure did not collapse as stated. A personal inspection of
the site was made by our Claims Representatives, outside
Engineer, and contractors.
0. Kent Rich, of Ad an son Engineering?, exaniner! the Crookston
hone and determined that five out of the 12 sections of the
outer shell needed to be replaced.
#2 Allegation - Three estimates for reconstruction were
submitted for S4S>,60G, 551,000, and $74,000.
Pesnonse - It is correct that these bids were submitted, but
this was prior to an analysis Leino done by Adamson
Pngineering. All throe of the abov-2 indicated estimates
included tsarinq down the entire structure and rebuilding. This

APPENDIX L
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is new style construction in the area and it was felt that an
Engineer's opinion should fce obtained in order to adequately
evaluate the danage.
#3 Alienation - The insurance company stalled for a period of
six months before paying the clain.
Response - There was a six-month delay in the settlement of
this claim. The delay was caused by the insured's attorney
failing to cooperate in filling out the necessary proofs of
loss. Our company also diligently worked in obtaining copies of
the blue prints so that a proper estimate of the damage could be
made.
The blue prints v^re delivered to our Claims Representative by
Mr. Klemm on April 30, 1982. The estimates obtained by Mr.
Klemm were given to us on March 29,1932, March 31, 1982, and Mav
20, 1982.
While we agree tiiat there was a long delay in the settlement
process, we do not feel that our personnel were responsible.
#4 Mlegation - Farmers Insurance had its own Engineer examine
the bids, and another estimate was obtained from a contractor
using the previously submitted bids.
Response - 0. Kent Rich is an independent contractor and a
licensed Engineer in the State of Utah. His expertise was
sought in order to properly evaluate the claim. Be was hired by
Farmers Insurance to evaluate this one particular loss.
The Phipps Construction Company bid of 527,000 was arrived at by
Mr. Fhipps examining the blue prints and consulting with O. I^ent
Rich of Adamson Engineering. Mr. Phipps is in no way employed
by Farmers Insurance Group.
#5 Allegation - Lack of cooperation or communication by Farmers
Insurance Group with Mr. Klemm.

Response - ?*r. T*lenrn was c a l l e d on June 14, 1982, and on June
15, 1902. JSessages were l e f t t h r e e times on the two s e p a r a t e
days but he did not r e t u r n these c a l l s .
#6 fi. l i e c a t i o n - i ^ g o c i a t i o n r . were d i r e c t l y with thts i;cckv
Ilcuiicam f t a t e Pank of Dourtiful for $27,000.
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Response - Negotiations were carried on with the Rocky
Mountain State Bank for a total of $32,744. This settlement
includes $27,744 damages plus $5,000 accrued interest.
The interest payment was questionable because it occurred due to
lack of cooperation from the insured.
#7 Allegation - The insurance company misled Mr. Klemm and told
him on tha day settlement was made that the claim was not ready
to settle.
Response - In addition to the three calls listed above, the
Claims Representative again called Mr. Klemm after settlement
had been concluded with the bank. The Claims Representative
attempted to explain to Mr. Klemm the basis for the settlement,
but Mr. Klemm became angry and stated he would file suit and
hung up. There is no indication that Mr. Klemm contacted this
office prior to the day the settlement was made.
^8 Allegation - Farmers Insurance obtained a bid from a
contractor who knew that he would not have to rebuild the home
at the price he stated in his bid. It is further a doubt in Mr.
Klemm1s mind that the contractor ever visited the home in
question. It is further alleged by Mr. Klemm that the bid was
obtained by our company with the idea of depriving the
Crookstons of the benefits available under the policy.
Response - These allegations are incorrect. Phipps
Construction Company made an estimate to repair the actual
damage based upon the Engineer's scope rather than to tear down
and rebuild as the other three contractors suggested. Phipps
Construction Company intended to do this job for the estimated
amount and still feels the estimates are adecuate to make a
substantial profit on this job. Mr. Phipps is willing to
testify that he was on the construction site at least six
different times, had two neetinns with Gyro Steel, Incorporated
to obtain correct prices, spent at least 25 additional hours
developing his estimate.
Our Ogden Claims Office recontacted Mr. ^hipps on October 25,
1932 and asked if he was willing to do the repairs at his
estimated price. Mr. Phipps at that time indicated he felt it
would still be profitable for him to do that job and was willing
to do so for the estimated price.
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I hope this letter adequately explains the actions taken by our
conpany in attempting to settle this claim. I an enclosing
portions of our file, including the Engineer1s report, bid fron
Phipps Construction Company, and other documents which I feel
are pertinent.
If you have any further questions, please write me.
Sincerely yours,

Sam B. O l s e n
R e g i o n a l C l a i m s Manager
S30:ca
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STATE OF UTAH

^

SCOTT M. MATHES0N
Governor

INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

ROGER C. DAY

326 SOUTH FIFTH EAST

3C:

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
PHONE (801) 533-5611
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HiroiH KLERKS OPPICS
DAVID L. W I L K I N S O N (#3472)
Attorney G e n e r a l
STEPHEN G. S C H W E N D I M A N (#2891)
C h i e f r A s s i s t a n t Attorney G e n e r a l
B R Y C E H. PETTEY (#2593)
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & B u s i n e s s R e g u l a t i o n D i v .
A t t o r n e y s for G e o r g e S u t t o n ,
C o m m i s s i o n e r of F i n a n c i a l
I n s t i t u t i o n s of the State of U t a h
130 State C a p i t o l Building
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 4
Telephone:
(801) 533-5319
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IN T H E THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T
IN AMD FOR 4&G» COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
POSSESSION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN
S T A T E BANK B Y T H E C O M M I S S I O N E R
OF F I N A N C I A L I N S T I T U T I O N S

:
:
:
:
:

ORDER APPROVING POSSESSION
/? r> ^7 C~ ~7r J ^>
Civil No. (S~JL-jJI-l~/JuL~5
J u d g e J. D e n n i s Frederick

T h i s matter came b e f o r e the C o u r t §.& u&Lfce on the /yQ~~~
day of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 7 , p u r s u a n t t o the "Verified P e t i t i o n for Order
Approving P o s s e s s i o n " of Rocky M o u n t a i n State Bank

("Bank") by

G e o r g e S u t t o n , C o m m i s s i o n e r of F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s of the
State of Utah ("Commissioner").

T h e C o m m i s s i o n e r w a s represented

by B r y c e H. P e t t e y , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l .
It appearing to the C o u r t that t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r h a s ,
under U i a k ^ C o d e . A Q n ^ § 7-2-1(2) (Supp. 1 9 8 7 ) , found that:
(1)

T h e Bank h a s violated l a w s , rules and r e g u l a t i o n s

governing the B a n k , which in part c o n s t i t u t e s g r o u n d s for taking
p o s s e s s i o n under Ut&b-JCLaiaJklllL*. § 7-2-1(1) (b) (Supp. 1 9 8 7 ) ; and

Exhibit "A"
APPENDIX N

(2)
unauthorized

The Bank is conducting its business in an
or unsafe manner,

and is engaging

in conduct inju-

rious to its depositors and the public, which in part constitutes
grounds for takiny possession under U.t&tl_£o<ie_&aai_ § 7-2-1(1) (c)
(Supp. 1987); and
(3)

The Dank has been notified by the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation

("F.D.I.C.•') , which is the Bank's primary

account insurer, of F . D . I . C ' s

intention to initiate proceedings

to terminate such insurance, and the Bank is otherwise not in a
sound and safe condition to transact its business, which in part
constitutes grounds for taking possession under Utafc_C.odg._Ann..
i, 7-2-1(1) (d) (Supp. 1987); and
(4)

The Bank has failed to maintain a minimum amount

of capital as required by the Department of Financial Institutions ("Department11) and the F . D . I . C , which in part constitutes
grounds for taking possession under Utak-Qod^-Ann^ § 7-2-1(1)(e)
(Supp. 1987); and
(5)

The Bank has become or is about to become

insolvent, which in part constitutes grounds for taking possession under U.taJlJ£&&£jkaai. S 7-2-1(1) (f) (Supp. 1987); and
(6)

The Bank has failed or refused to comply with the

terms of a duly and legally authorized order issued by the Commissioner and by the F . D . I . C , which in part constitutes grounds
for taking possession under Utah,Cpde...Appi. § 7-2-1(1) (g) (Supp.
1987); and
-2-

(7)

The remedies provided in Ut&llJ£&4£_4nrL±_ §§ 7-1-

307, -308, and -313 (Supp. 1987) are ineffective or impracticable
to protect the interest of the Bank's depositors, creditors, and
shareholders, which in part constitutes grounds for taking possession under UtahiCode,Annt § 7-1-1(1)(k) (Supp. 1987); and
It appearing to the Court that the purpose of this
proceeding is to provide this Court with supervisory jurisdiction
to review the actions of the Commission in accordance with, and
pursuant to UtakJ^Qd.e._AQxu. § 7-2-2 (Supp. 1987) ; and
It appearing to the Court that all conditions required
l^Y UtatLj^od^j^ao.^ § 7-2-1(2) (Supp. 1987) have been met for the
Commissioner to take possession of the Bank;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial

Institutions of the State of Utah, is authorized to take immediate possession of the Bank, and thereupon the Commissioner is
vested, by this Order and by operation of law, with title to, and
the right to possession of, the business, property, and all
assets of the Bank.
2.

George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial

Institution of the State of Utah, is authorized and directed to
rehabilitate, reorganize, liquidate or give effect to the acquisition of control of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or
a portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all or a portion
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of the liabilities of, the Bank in such manner as the Commissioner determines to be in the best interest of the Bank's depositors, creditors, shareholders and other parties in interest, and
to do all other things in connection therewith as may be authorized by law.
3.

George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial

Institutions of the State of Utah, is authorized to appoint a
liquidator or receiver for the Bank if the Commissioner deems it
appropriate to do so.
4.
immediately

All persons are ordered and directed
to the Commissioner

to turn over

any of the business, property or

assets of the Bank in their possession.
5.

This Order shall operate as a stay of the

commencement or continuation of:
(a)

Any judicial, administrative or other proceeding

against the Bank, including service of process;
(b)

Enforcement of any judgement against the Bank;

(c)

Any act to obtain possession of property of or

from the Bank;
(d)

Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien

against property of the Bank;
(e)

Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim

against the Bank; and

- 4 -

(f)

The s e t o f f

of any debt owning t o the Bank a g a i n s t

any claim a g a i n s t the Bank.
DATED t h i s

$J._ day of August, 1987.

AT7KT
H. DIXON

rt'r:3l/%'

Deputy CicifU
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTKOM (A3462)
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for
Rocky Mountain State Bank
in Supreme Court Case No. 870252
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNT*
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

ORDER
C i v i l No.
Judge J.

C87-5743
Dennis

Frederick

* * * * * * * *

Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion

to Lift Stay, peti-

tioning this Court to lift the U.C.A. § 7-2-7 stay of litigation
against Rocky Mountain State Bank for purposes of the appeal in
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 870252, having come before this Court
for hearing on Friday, April 8, 1988; this Court having reviewed
said motion and a supporting memorandum, having heard oral argument, and having taken the matter under advisement with a request
for supplemental briefs to be submitted to this Court after the
Utah Supreme Court reconsidered
870252

and

No.

880034;

this

its consolidation
Court

APPENDIX O

having

of Case No.
reviewed

all

supplemental briefs and having

taKen notice ot the Order

of the

Utah Supreme Court dated April 18, 1988 denying consolidation of
Cases No. 870252 and No. 880034; and this Court having found that
Fire

Insurance

Exchange

has

not

shown

cause

why

the

U.C.A.

§ 7-2-7 stay should be lifted; now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED

that Fire

Insurance Exchange's

Motion to Lift Stay be and it is hereby denied.
ENTERED t h i s

Approved as t o

/fcJWy

form:

P H I L I F R. T I S H L E R , E s q .
STEPHEN J . TRAYNER, E s q ,

of

n|/l

f

1988.

CERTIFICATE OF

bbRVlCK

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2 * ~
day of April, 1988, to:
Attorneys for
Fire Insurance Exchange
Philip R. Fishier, Esq.
Stephen J. Trayner, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor
Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for FDIC
Peter W. Billings, Sr., Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Attorneys for Crookstons
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

322:042888A
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STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
August 18, 1988
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
L. Rich Humpherys
Chrisentensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

In the Matter of the Possession
of Rocky Mountain State Bank by
the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions,
Appellee,
v.
Fire Insurance Exchange Company,
Appellant.

No. 880223

The appeal by Fire Insurance Exchange is this day dismissed
on the Court's own motion, as it is not taken from a final
appealable order.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
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, BRIEF
LAW O F F I C E S

^DOCKET; NO.

STRONG &
GLENN C. HANNI, P.C.
HENRY E. HEATH
PHILIP R. FISHLER
ROGER H. BULLOCK
ROBERT A. BURTON
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS
DENNIS M. ASTILL
S. BAIRO MORGAN
STUART H. SCHULTZ
PAUL W. HESS
PAUL M, BELNAP
BARBARA L. MAW*

MARK J. TAYLOR1
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
JOSEPH J . JOYCE
BRADLEY W. BOWEN
VICTORIA K. KIDMAN
G. ERIC NIELSON 1
ROBERT L. JANICKI
CLIFFORD J. PAYNE
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY
PETER H. CHRISTENSEN4
H. BURT RINGWOOD

HANNI

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
SIXTH F L O O R B O S T O N

BUILDING

S A L T L A K E CITY, UTAH

&A\\\

TELEPHONE <80«) 5 3 2 - 7 0 8 0
TELEFAX (801) 5 9 6 - 1 5 0 8
GORDON R. STRONG
(1909-1969)

March 21, 1991

HAND-DELIVERED

1 ALSO MEMBER ARIZONA BAR
1ALSO MEMBER CALIFORNIA BAR
SALSO MEMBER IDAHO BAR
4ALSO MEMBER OREGON BAR

MAR 2 2 1991
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
RE:

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange
Case No. 880034

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the Crookstons, respondents in the above-captioned matter, hereby
submit the following supplemental citation:
REFERENCE IN BRIEF
Point XI, pp. 89-100
THE
TRIAL
COURT
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO
ALLOW FIRE INSURANCE . ADEQUATE
OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CITATION
Gilmour v. Cumminqs. 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (1991)
SUBJECT
Utah Court of Appeals reversed granting of summary judgment by the
Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick presiding, on the ground the trial court acted
prematurely in ruling on motion in contravention of Utah Code Jud.
Admin. 4-501(1)(b).
Issue of premature granting of summary
judgment not raised by plaintiff-appellant on appeal.

48

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
March 21, 1991
Page 2
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
STRONG & HANNI

SJT/af
cc: L. Rich Humphreys
Frank Roybal
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